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ABSTRACT 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to address the role of government payments in the allocation of 
farm labor through three essays. 
 
 Government payments have been a part of agriculture since 1933 and at no time has the 
government stated a policy objective of decreasing the agricultural labor force.  Using time series 
data and new econometric techniques, the first essay finds agricultural policy may have an 
unintended impact on labor migration. Specifically, we find that government payments increased 
labor migration from the farm. From 1939 to 2007, increased direct government payments 
resulted in greater migration of labor from agriculture.   
 The second essay assesses the degree of differentiation between family and hired labor. This 
addresses the ease at which decoupled government payments can subsidize off-farm labor. 
Intuitively, these forms of farm labor should have different impacts on production. We test this 
assumption by estimating the elasticity of substitution between hired and family labor using the 
ARMS dataset. The results provide little evidence to support the homogeneity assumption and 
further indicate that the elasticity of substitution is unitary under most scenarios. 
The final essay addresses the determinants of off-farm labor supply by incorporating both 
modern issues and techniques. The goal of this research is to determine the impact of health 
insurance coverage and government payments on the off-farm labor supply of the farm operator 
and spouse. We first test for dependence in the off-farm labor allocation of the operator and 
spouse using copulas. We then account for endogeneity in the health insurance variable and 
jointly estimate off-farm labor supply using a bivariate tobit model. The data used in this 
research is from 2006-2008 Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS). The results of 
this study show that the off-farm labor supply of the operator and spouse is positively correlated 
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and that there is a highly significant, positive impact of off-farm insurance coverage on the hours 
worked off-farm. The results further demonstrate the importance of fringe benefits as a 
component of the total wage and find significant evidence that greater government payments 
decrease the number of hours that both the operator and spouse work off-farm.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation addresses three key questions the farm family faces regarding the decision to 
work off-farm.  How powerful are the incentives to leave? How powerful are the incentives to 
stay? How replaceable is my labor on the farm? Specifically discussed hereafter is the success of 
government payments in retaining the farm labor force, the substitutability of family labor, and 
the impact of modern incentives, like health insurance, on the number of hours farm families 
work off-farm.   
The second chapter of this dissertation provides an analysis of where we’ve been.  It 
addresses the government’s role in preserving the farm labor force over the last 68 years. 
Government payments to agriculture have grown considerably over this period of time. Not only 
have payments grown, the composition of government payment has changed considerably over 
this time period. The most marked changes in composition occurred in 1996 with the emergence 
of decoupled government payments. This shift in payment structure occurred in part as a result of 
pressure from the World Trade Organization. The driving for change was, as the name implies, 
to decouple agricultural subsidies form commodity prices. This prevents the policy actions of the 
US government from significantly influencing world commodity prices. 
At the moment, the 2012 Farm Bill is being debated. Due to the current fiscal environment, 
decreased aggregate spending on agricultural subsidies is expected. Particularly, decoupled 
payments are expected to receive significant decreases in funding. From this perspective, it is 
vitally important to understand how aggregate changes to farm programs will impact the flow of 
workers from agriculture. The knowledge provided the by the second chapter, especially 
regarding the changing in policy composition, will help us form expectations of what is likely to 
occur if these changes are essentially reversed in the latest Farm Bill. In a more general sense, it 
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is also important to assess whether the government’s effort to preserve the farm labor force have 
been successful. This is a common theme used by policymakers when proposing these policies; 
therefore, feedback on the aggregate effectiveness of the policies is needed.   
While the second chapter address government’s role in farm exits, it’s also important to 
consider the role of dual employment in agriculture. The third chapter analyzes how easily a 
farm family member can work off-farm and simultaneously hire a worker to fill in on the farm. 
In the literature, it is often assumed that family member’s labor can be substituted perfectly with 
other sources of labor. The question of interest is how easily can family labor be replaced on the 
farm if the farm household can benefit from either the operator or spouse devoting time to off-
farm work?  The fourth chapter analyzes the power of fringe benefits as an incentive for the farm 
household to allocate labor off-farm. Together, these chapters provide new perspectives on how 
willing and able are family members to work off-farm.   
From a practical perspective, there are multiple reasons for addressing these topics. First, 
consider the old maxim “Never work for family” which implies some inherent difficulty in 
family working together in a business environment. If there is merit to this statement and the 
only alternative form of labor is non-family, then you can reason that these forms of labor are not 
perfectly equivalent. The goal of the third essay is to provide statistical evidence to measure this 
relationship between forms of farm labor.  
If the assumption of homogenous farm labor is upheld, then there are implications for farm 
policy research both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, the validity of models used to 
represent the farm household previously is upheld. The results of which are essentially a single 
demand curve representing family and hired farm labor. This implies that hired and family labor 
receive the same wage for farm labor. Intuitively, it is implausible that a family laborer will 
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receive the exact same hourly wage, fringe benefits, and identical working environment as a 
hired worker. Empirically, the substitutability of farm labor has implications for model 
specification. If labor is homogenous, there only a single labor input is required in production 
models. Otherwise, failure to include both forms of labor as separate inputs may result in 
misspecification.   
After addressing the ability of the farm household to engage in dual employment, the fourth 
essay focuses on the power of the incentives to engage in this behavior. Specifically, the final 
essay looks at the interaction between one of the predominant social issues facing the nation, 
health care, and the off-farm labor decisions of farm households.  Like small businesses in other 
sectors, the potential financial burden created by employee sponsored health insurance plans are 
considerable for farms. Many families with small business have a family member that engages in 
labor outside of the family business primarily to provide fringe benefits like health insurance.  
Coupled with the financial risk inherent to farming, it may be even more difficult for farm 
businesses to provide these benefits. This implies that farm households may be even more likely 
to have members allocating hours to off-farm labor for fringe benefits. Full consideration has not 
been given to this aspect of the off-farm wage and the role it plays in the labor allocation 
decision of farm households. If this component of the full off-farm wage is significant, then the 
estimates provided by previous studies of off-farm labor allocation may be biased.  
A related issue addressed in the fourth chapter is the jointness of labor decisions in the farm 
household. Most studies in this area employ a theoretical model that assumes labor decisions are 
made independently. This means that when an operator or spouse makes a decision as to how 
they will allocate their time, they make this decision irrespective of their significant other’s time 
allocation decisions. It is implausible that a household will function in this manner in either the 
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short or long run. A hallmark of a well-functioning household is effective communication 
between the husband and wife. Assuming labor decisions are made independently thereby 
assumes a lack of communication between the operator and spouse. Even the household can 
function with an absence of communication in the short run, how reasonable is it to expect this 
behavior to persist in the long run. A worst, the absence of communication result in deterioration 
of the household to the point of divorce and thereby render our entire model inapplicable.   
From a practical perspective, the reasoning clearly supports the joint modeling of household 
labor allocation. The empirical evidence provides mixed support in this regard.  The final essay 
provides a convenient statistical test to empirical determine whether labor allocation decisions 
are made jointly. Once this relationship is established, we incorporate this information into our 
decision of how to most appropriate model the off-farm labor supply of the farm operator and 
spouse. As a result, a bivariate tobit model is used to determine the importance of insurance 
coverage on hours worked off-farm by the operator and spouse.  
Further, prior research has demonstrated a negative relationship between off-farm labor and 
government payments. These studies neither adequately account for fringe benefits nor provide 
clear reasoning on the jointness of labor decisions. As a result, we include government payments 
in the model to determine whether this relationship changes when fully accounting for the 
components of off-farm wage. 
The results of this dissertation allow us to address various shortcomings in the farm 
household and labor economics literature. A key void that is addressed by the sum of this 
research is the impact of government payments on farm household labor allocation. Specifically, 
we can gain some key insights into the empirical question of the impact of government payments 
on the allocation of farm labor. This information will be of vital importance as budget constraints 
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persist and the Farm Bill debates continue. An accurate picture of how each aspect of 
government policy impacts the welfare of farm households is needed by policymakers to 
correctly determine the gains/losses from alternative proposals.    
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CHAPTER 2: FEAST OR FLEE: GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS AND LABOR 
MIGRATION FROM AGRICULTURE
1 
 
Introduction 
 
 The government has provided financial assistance to farmers since the 1930’s.  The 
various programs suggested by policymakers are often proposed under the moniker of preserving 
the farm family.  Attempts to uphold this way of life have been in the face of rapid industrial 
growth, dramatic technological advance, sharp population growth, and a rise in relative wages 
off-farm.  These changes over past decades have impacted all sectors of the economy including 
agriculture.  According to Mishra, El-Osta, and Gillespie (2009), if the purpose of farm policy is 
to raise farmers’ income and standard of living, then policy provisions need to be reconsidered as 
changes occur in farm households and businesses.      
Today, off-farm income is approximately six times greater than cash farm income and 
comprises nearly 80% of total household income (Mishra et al. 2002; El-Osta, Mishra, and 
Morehart 2008). Off-farm labor is no longer classified as transitional but rather the primary 
source of income for farm households.  Considering the nature of government payments 
remained relatively unchanged until the development of decoupled payments in the 1996 Farm 
Bill, the performance of government programs in achieving their stated goals is unclear.   
Considerable research has focused on the effects of government payments on the labor 
allocation decisions of farm operators and spouses (Ahearn and El-Osta 1992; Ahearn, El-Osta, 
and Dewbre 2006; El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn 2004; Mishra and Goodwin 1997; Goodwin and 
Mishra 2004). These studies have largely been cross-sectional in nature and often used farm-
level data. Results from the above studies indicate that increased government payments, 
                                                          
1
This chapter has been reproduced courtesy of Journal of Policy Modeling. Authorization from publisher, Elsevier, 
for reproduction is found in the appendix. Article can be found online at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.10.002. 
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particularly decoupled payments (direct payments), decreased the number of hours worked off-
farm by operators—essentially reinforcing the wealth effect.  
 Only a few studies have focused on how government payments have affected the 
migration of labor from a macroeconomic perspective. Barkley (1990) while studying the effect 
of government payments on labor migration concludes that total government payments have no 
effect on the migration of labor from agriculture from 1940 to 1985. His results are inconsistent 
with the findings obtained in the micro-level analysis (farm-level data) of U.S. farm households 
(Dewbre and Mishra 2007; El-Osta, Mishra, and Ahearn 2004).  
The objective of this paper is to re-assess the impact of government payments on 
agricultural labor force migration now that more data and newer methodology has become 
available since the work of Barkley (1990).  Specifically, the primary research question is 
presented by the following null and alternative hypotheses: 
Ho:  Increased direct government payments has had no effect on the  
 migration of labor from agriculture.   
Ha:  Increased direct government payments has altered the migration  
 of labor from agriculture.   
 Our results provide evidence for rejecting the null and indicate that increased government 
payments are positively correlated with greater migration of labor from agriculture from 1939 to 
2007.  A shrinking agricultural labor force is certainly not desirable by policymakers’ standards 
and lends supports the proposition that policy provisions have not been adequately reconsidered 
as changes have occurred in farm households and businesses.  There is evidence to suggest 
longstanding programs designed for conservation and commodity buyouts may be attributable to 
migration from agriculture (Snell 2005; Gardner 1999; USDA 2010; Edwards and DeHaven 
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2001).  More recent trends in agricultural programs, like decoupling of payments, may also be 
credited with the out-migration of labor (El-Osta, Mishra, and Morehart 2008).   
Background and Conceptual Model 
Direct government payments in the U.S. began modestly in the early 1930’s and 
remained relatively stable through the 1960’s (Figure 1). With the passage of the 1973 Farm Bill 
direct government payments began an upward climb. Today, an average of $18.2 billion is 
distributed annually by the federal government to farmers in the form of direct government 
payments. These payments comprise nearly 30% of farm net income on average (USDA 2009) 
and include fixed direct payments, emergency/disaster payments, commodity programs, counter-
cyclical payments, marketing loan benefits, tobacco transition payments, and conservation 
program payments.     
 
Figure 1:  Direct Governemnt Payments (1939-2008) 
 
 A comprehensive list of programs included in direct government payments is presented in 
Table 1, both preceding and following the 1996 Farm Bill. The 1996 Farm Bill legislation 
established production flexibility contract (PFC) payments and significantly altered the manner 
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in which payments are distributed to farmers. The 2002 Farm Bill later reclassified PFC 
payments as fixed direct or decoupled government payments.  
Table 1:  Definition of Direct Government Payment before and after 1996 
1939 to 1995 1996 to 2007 
Feed Grain, Wheat, Rice Cotton, and Wool  
(Crop Specific) Program Payments 
Production Flexibility Contract (PFC)/Fixed 
Direct Payments 
Conservation Program Payments Counter-cyclical Payments 
Miscellaneous Programs
2
 Marketing Loan Gains 
 Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP) 
 Certificate Exchange Gains 
 Peanut Quota Buyouts 
 Milk Income Loss Payments 
 Tobacco Transition 
 Conservation Program 
 Ad Hoc Emergency Program 
 Miscellaneous Programs
3
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Direct Government Payments (1996-2008)  
                                                          
2
 Miscellaneous programs from 1939-1949 are attributed to the Sugar Act, Price Adj and Parity, and Wartime 
Production/Subsidy.  From 1950-1955, Miscellaneous payments were relatively low and source unknown.  From 
1956-1970 payments are completely attributable to the Soil Bank Program (ended in 1971) and from 1971-1996 
include all other programs.  From 1990 -1996, loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains were included in 
Miscellaneous Payments   
 
3
 Miscellaneous programs (post 1996) include Acreage Grazing Payments, Additional Interest Payments, American 
Indian Livestock Feed Program, American Indian Livestock Feed Program--Apportioned, DCC--Fruit 
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Figure 2 shows the prominence of decoupled payments, especially in 1996 and 1997, 
when decoupled payments accounted for 81% of direct government payments. While the share of 
decoupled payments has declined in recent years, the average has remained relatively stable at 
$5.244 billion (see Table 2). Together, the average amount of marketing loan gains, loss 
deficiency payments (LDP), and ad hoc emergency payments are approximately equal to 
decoupled payments but exhibit greater variation.  
Table 2:  Summary statistics for various components of Direct Government Payment (1996-
2007), (millions of $) 
Government Program Mean Std Dev 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Decoupled Payments 5,244.37 751.42 0.14 
Counter-cyclical Payments 1,044.05 1,502.19 1.44 
Marketing Loans and LDP's 2,671.37 2,822.27 1.06 
Certificate Exchange Gains 595.94 605.17 1.02 
Peanut, Milk, and Tobacco Payments 676.06 799.61 1.18 
Conservation Programs 2,206.77 592.06 0.27 
Ad Hoc Emergency Programs 3,064.11 3,223.47 1.05 
Total 15,431.89 5,801.80 0.38 
 
The components of direct government payments from 1939 to 1996 are also presented in 
Table 1. From 1961 to 1996, crop specific payments averaged about 70% of total direct 
government payments. Feed grains comprised a maximal share of 56% of direct payments in 
1965 and minimal share of 4% in 1984. Table 3 provides additional summary statistics on the 
four largest components of direct government payments prior to 1996. While feed grain 
payments were the primary component of direct government payments from 1961-1996, 
significant resources were also devoted to conservation and miscellaneous payments over this 
period. Conservation and miscellaneous payments were also significant sources of variability for 
this period.   
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Table 3:  Summary statistics for various components of Direct Government Payment (1961- 
 1995), (millions of $) 
Government Program Mean Std Dev 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Feed Grains 1,863.86 1,907.34 1.02 
Wheat 980.53 828.38 0.84 
Conservation Programs 479.10 572.97 1.20 
Misc Programs 692.85 1,133.87 1.64 
 
 Coinciding with the trends in direct government payments has been a steady migration of 
labor from agriculture. Bloom and Freeman (1988) document the shift in labor forces of 
developing countries from agriculture to industry and service sectors during the period of 1965 to 
1985.  In the U.S., farm labor has declined over 50% in just under 50 years, from total 
employment of 5.5 million in 1960 to 2.1 million in 2007 (U.S. Department of Labor 2009). 
Cochrane (1993) describes a structural change in U.S. agriculture. He notes a long-run trend of 
declining inputs of human labor and increasing inputs of mechanical power/machinery. This 
trend still holds in agriculture domestically and abroad, thereby resulting in downward pressure 
on agricultural labor. Prior studies using a time series approach have provided little evidence of a 
significant relationship between direct government payments and migration of labor from 
agriculture. Barkley (1990) found there was no significant relationship between migration from 
agriculture and total direct government payments.  
 A theoretical model for labor migration was originally proposed by Mundlak (2000) and 
further developed by Barkley (1990), where an individual exists in a two-sector economy and 
faces a decision to allocate labor to agriculture or non-agriculture. The individual will migrate 
from agriculture to the non-agricultural sector if their expected discounted utility from non-
agricultural employment is greatest. Specifically, let us assume that the indirect utility functions 
for an individual   is evaluated for the conditions in agriculture and non-agriculture by   ( ) and 
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  ( ), respectively, and introduce an index function   that takes on value 0 or 1 to be determined 
by:  
[  ( )    ( )]   (   )     (1) 
In equation 1, if the first term is positive then the individual benefits from migration and the 
function    (   ) takes on a value 1 and 0 otherwise. Potential migrants must estimate the 
probability of obtaining a job in nonagricultural sector. This probability is incorporated into the 
empirical model through inclusion of variables like non-agricultural unemployment rate and 
relative size of the sectoral labor force. Finally, economic conditions within the agricultural 
sector, such as, government payments to farmers and farmland values are also expected to affect 
the flow of labor out of agriculture. On the other hand, labor can also migrate into agriculture 
and can be represented as: 
[  ( )    ( )]   (   )     (2) 
Summing equation 1 and 2 yields the number of migrants: 
 (   )  ∑    (   )
  
  ∑    (   )
  
   (3) 
In equation 3, (   ) is a function of the arguments of the indirect utility functions in the two 
sectors ( (   )) and is also a function of the size of the labor force in the origin. The number of 
migrants generated by the same economic environment characterized by (   )
 
will vary by the 
size of the labor force and its sectoral composition. A larger labor force in agriculture results in 
greater potential for migration. Similarly, larger the labor market in the destination, the easier it 
should be for the new migrants to find employment. Finally, labor force can be introduced in 
equation 3 while maintaining the constant-returns-to-scale property with respect to the sectoral 
labor: 
 ( )   (   )  ( )
       ( )
                  0 ≤   ≤ 1   (4) 
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where   ( ) and     ( ) are the labor force in agriculture and non-agriculture, respectively. 
After dividing both sides of equation 4 by   (   ), the migration as a proportion of 
agricultural labor is represented by  (
 
  
)  the sectoral labor ratio by   (
    
  
)  and the ratio 
of sectoral income by   (
    
  
). When (   ) the sectoral incomes are equal and no 
migration takes place. However, due to cost associated with migration ( )  there are reasons to 
believe that migration will stop when (   ). 
Data and Empirical Model 
 In addition to the explanatory variable for government payments, controls for the relative 
size of the agricultural labor force, probability of obtaining work off-farm, the relative returns to 
working off-farm, and farmers’ expectations for the future of agriculture were also included in 
the model.  The time-series data used for this research was collected from multiple sources and 
covers the years 1939 to 2007.  First was the Current Population Survey (CPS), a monthly survey 
collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  It is important to note that there were several 
changes in variable definitions and survey methods for the CPS over the period of study. Dummy 
variables were included for these years to control for these transitional periods.  Three of the 
years in which the survey methodology changed were found significant (1972, 1978, and 2000).    
 The CPS was the source for the employment data used to calculate the dependent 
variable, labor migration, and the explanatory variable representing the probability of obtaining 
work off-farm.  An empirical measure of outmigration follows the work of Mundlak (1979) 
where labor migration is limited to occupational migration at the aggregate level. In particular, 
migration from the agricultural sector is defined as the percentage change in agricultural 
employment from one year, say (t-1) to the next year (t). Here the definition considers only 
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changes in the number of jobs in the farm agricultural sector. In particular, the dependent 
variable is defined as: 
  
           
      
  (5) 
where        is total agricultural employment in previous year (t-1) and      is the total 
agricultural employment in current year (t).
4
  Also provided by the CPS was the annual non-
farm, unemployment rate (U) used as a proxy for the probability of obtaining off-farm work. As 
the probability of obtaining a job off-farm falls (unemployment increases), the migration of labor 
from agriculture is expected to decrease.     
Data on direct government payments, net farm income, and nominal land values are from 
the “Farm Income Data” produced by the Economic Research Service (ERS) (USDA 2009). 
Land values are then deflated using the Producer Price Index (PPI) for Farm Equipment (U.S. 
Department of Labor 2009) to obtain the real land values (    ). This inflation measure is used 
rather than the PPI for farm products because, like equipment, farmland is a capital input in the 
production process. Assuming efficient land markets, the real land value represents farmers’ 
expectations for the future of the agricultural sector.  The real land price is the present value of 
all expected future cash flows; therefore, greater belief in the future of agriculture will increase 
the expected future cash flows and thereby increase land values. 
 Government payments (   ) is defined as,  
     
                          
               
   (6) 
The Gov ratio measures government payments as a proportion of the annual net farm income 
(Barkley 1990). One potential issue with this definition of government payments is the accuracy 
                                                          
4
 Although Mishra et al. 2002 point out that part-time farming is becoming a permanent feature in American 
agriculture, due to data limitations this development is ignored in this study.  
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of net farm income. Questions arise from the manner in which farm operators are generally 
compensated and the disincentive that arises from reporting net farm income on an annual basis. 
First, operators generally are compensated by an “owner’s draw” paid from the farm profits. 
Secondly, greater pre-tax profits result in large tax liabilities; therefore, when faced with the 
decision of paying additional taxes on farm income or spending the farm earnings elsewhere the 
farmer is expected to choose the latter.  
 In light these measurement issues, separate models with alternative definitions of 
government payments are estimated in this study. The first model follows the definition provided 
in equation (6). The second simply uses direct government payments, thereby assuming net farm 
income equal to one. These models will be referred to in Table 4 as “Gov Ratio” and “Gov 
Pmts”, respectively.  
A measure of the relative returns of working in agriculture compared to the non-
agricultural sector is included.  The expectation is that as the returns to agriculture increase on a 
relative basis, labor migration from agriculture will decrease.  The return to labor in each sector 
is measured by the average product of labor (   ) in the respective sectors.  As defined by 
Barkley (1990) the returns ratio (   ) is calculated as, 
    
      
    
 
      
    
    
  
⁄   (7) 
The variables        and      represent the average product of labor for the non-agricultural 
and agricultural sectors, respectively.  Specifically, non-agricultural average product of labor 
(      ) is defined as the gross domestic product from the non-agriculture sector (      ) 
divided non-agriculture labor force (    ).       is defined as the gross domestic product from 
the agriculture sector (    ) divided by the agricultural labor force (  ). Data used to calculate 
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       and      is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. Department of Commerce 
2009), while the labor force data for      and    is from the CPS.   
 A measure of the relative size of the agricultural and non-agricultural labor force is also 
included.  LF represents the ability of the non-agricultural sector to absorb workers from 
agriculture.  
   
    
  
    (8) 
According to Barkley (1990), as the non-agricultural labor force grows relative to the agricultural 
labor force (LF increases), the non-agricultural sectors of the economy are expected to be 
increasingly able to absorb farm workers.  Therefore, a positive correlation between LF and m is 
expected.   
 A function describing the migration of labor from agriculture can then be developed 
using the time varying explanatory variables, a vector of dummy variables (z), and stochastic 
disturbance term ( ).  
                               (9)    
A semi-logarithmic transformation of the explanatory variables was then used and each variable 
was tested for stationarity via an augmented Dickey-Fuller test. With exception to the annual 
unemployment rate, all explanatory variables were found non-stationary. Therefore, the first 
difference (denoted by Δ) of the following variables was taken:    (   ),    (   ),    (    ), 
and    (  ). The first differences were stationary but not co-integrated. Using the first differences 
alters the interpretation of the results. Consider the government payment variable, greater 
changes in log government payments from (t-1) to (t) will increase/decrease migration of labor 
from agriculture in time (t).  
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Prior labor migration models lagged all dependent variables one period (Barkley 1990; 
Mundlak 2000). This was done to decrease the likelihood of simultaneity and accounts for the 
time delay required for farmers to observe, process, and formulate expectations. The first 
difference was not used for the non-agricultural unemployment rate so the variable was lagged 
one period. Meaning, the probability of finding off-farm work in the prior period (t-1) determines 
whether the farmer will decide to migrate from agriculture in the current period (t).      
The migration of labor from agriculture is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) of 
the following form, 
                                       (    )    (10) 
       (   )         (   )          (  )        (    )     
This model was estimated using alternative definitions of government payments. In each case, 
migration would be a strictly increasing/decreasing function in direct government payments and 
there will exist a constant elasticity (     ), 
  
     (   )
 
  
     
               (
 
 
)  (11) 
In addition to estimating the model for the full data set, the model was partitioned in two 
groups, 1939–1995 and 1996–2007, to evaluate the importance of decoupled payments on the 
migration of labor from agriculture. In the time-partitioned models, government payments are 
included as a ratio of net farm income as described in equation (6). Following each estimated 
model, the Breush-Godfrey test and residual correlogram were used to test for autocorrelation.  
 This model was also estimated as an AR(1), autoregressive distributed lag model with 
     included as an explanatory variable. This approach yielded nearly identical results to 
ordinary least squares (OLS) in terms of coefficient estimates and significance. Using OLS 
allowed for an additional year of data to be used relative to the autoregressive model. One 
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drawback to using OLS rather than the AR(1) model was evidence of serial correlation for 1996-
2007, but the magnitude and significance of the coefficient estimates were equivalent across 
models for this time period.  For these reasons, only the results using OLS are reported.   
Results and Discussion 
The primary result of this research is that increases in government payments result in 
increased migration of labor from agriculture (Table 4).  This result is consistent using both 
definitions of government payments (column 2 and 3). These definitions produced nearly 
identical results; although, the government payment ratio appears to be more robust to serial 
correlation as evidenced by the Breusch-Pagan tests.  
Table 4: Parameter estimates of labor migration from agriculture 
Variable Gov Pmts Gov Ratio 1939-1995 1996-2007 
       0.0086** 0.0106*** 0.0105** 0.0015 
(0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0087) 
      0.6875*** 0.6771*** 0.6973*** 0.7733*** 
(0.0491) (0.0489) (0.0533) (0.1507) 
        -0.0508 -0.0521 -0.0542 -0.0237 
(0.0333) (0.0325) (0.0368) (0.0684) 
       0.0070 -0.0086 0.0069 -0.0163 
(0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0166) (0.0219) 
       -0.0219*** -0.0214*** -0.0210*** -0.0473* 
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0233) 
       -0.0226* -0.0220* -0.0193  
(0.0131) (0.0128) (0.0136)  
       -0.0285** -0.0285** -0.0264*  
(0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0134)  
       0.0358* 0.0346* 0 -0.0043 
(0.0181) (0.0178) 0 (0.0376) 
Constant -0.0710*** -0.0692*** -0.0698*** -0.1464* 
(0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0676) 
N 68 68 56 12 
R
2
 0.913 0.916 0.849 0.996 
Breusch–Godfrey (p-value) 0.1083 0.1532 0.3442 0.0022 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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We provide four possibilities for the positive and significant relationship between labor 
migration and farm program payments. The first explanation for this result involves increased 
decoupled payments. Assuming off-farm wages are greater than farm wages, a profit maximizing 
farm household may choose to devote greater hours to off-farm work and spend their increased 
income (total) on hiring an additional farm worker. This profit maximizing behavior may occur 
to the extent where farmers and/or spouses work full-time off-farm and effectively leave the 
agriculture labor force. Similarly, El-Osta, Mishra, and Morehart (2008) found that a $10,000 
increase in expected government payments increased the probability of the farm operator’s wife 
working off-farm when she is the only one devoting time off-farm. 
 The second explanation for the positive relationship between changes in direct 
government payments and migration from agriculture involve commodity buyout programs. 
From 2002 to 2008, peanut and tobacco quota buyouts were introduced. According to Snell 
(2005), the reaction from farmers to these programs was similar in the first year following the 
legislation. The response was a double-digit percentage decline in the number of peanut and 
tobacco acres planted. With steep declines in production, farm operators, spouses, and/or hired 
laborers may have sought employment in the non-agricultural sector.  
Third, conservation programs have been a part of agricultural policy since the 1930’s. In 
1985, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was established to idle marginally productive 
farmland, particularly in environmentally sensitive areas. According to Gardner (1999), USDA 
(2010), and Edward and DeHaven (2001), nearly 34 million acres of land had been idled due to 
CRP through 2006.  As a result of the retired acreage, there are fewer hired laborers needed for 
production and less acreage for the operator to manage, thereby increasing the time available for 
the farm operator to engage in off-farm labor, ceteris paribus.  
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Fourth, agricultural labor has also been replaced over time by capital and machinery 
improvements on the farm. Cochrane (1993) describes a structural change in U.S. agriculture 
resulting from a long-run trend of declining inputs of human labor, increasing inputs of 
mechanical power, machinery, and agricultural chemicals. Burfisher and Hopkins (2003) also 
noted a trend of declining labor intensity and increasing capital intensity in U.S. agriculture as 
evidence of the ease of input substitution in the long run. If increases in direct government 
payments are invested in capital improvements then migration of labor from agriculture would 
increase, ceteris paribus.  
Considering the possible explanations provided for the relationship between direct 
government payments and labor migration, the impact of the 1996 Farm Bill’s introduction of 
the free market concept in agriculture was also evaluated. Table 4 shows the estimated 
coefficients for the model from 1939-1995 and 1996-2007 (column 4 and 5, table 4). Using a 
Chow test, the null hypothesis of equality between the coefficient estimates for the change in 
direct government payments for 1939-1995 and full model (column 2 and 3) could not be 
rejected. Conversely, the coefficient estimate for 1996-2007 was not statistically significant.  We 
can conclude that the 1996 Farm Bill did not significantly alter the impact of government 
payment on the migration of labor from agriculture.    
The change in log real land values and return ratio were both found insignificant across 
all models. This result was surprising considering the results of Barkley (1990), who found the 
relationship between migration and the return ratio positive and highly significant, meaning 
increases in non-agricultural returns, ceteris paribus, entice farm worker to leave the agricultural 
sector. The results of the current research show that larger changes in returns ratio do not have a 
significant impact on migration. Real land values were also meant to capture the expectations 
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future conditions in the agricultural sector, assuming efficient land markets hold. Therefore, 
changes in the log expectations of farmers were not found to have a significant impact on labor 
migration.       
The log change in the labor force ratio (     ) is positive and significantly correlated 
with migration of labor from agriculture in all models, meaning that larger increases in the log 
labor force ratio result in greater absorption of agricultural labor into the off-farm labor force and 
hence increased migration from agriculture.  Additionally, the non-farm unemployment rate 
(       ) is negative and significantly correlated with migration of labor from agriculture. 
When the non-farm unemployment rate increases, farm workers’ prospect for off-farm labor 
diminishes and the rate of migration from agriculture declines. Additionally, the constant and all 
dummy variables were found significant for the model using the government payment ratio.  
Conclusions  
The results of this research indicated that government payments have had a positive 
influence on farm operators, spouses, and hired workers leaving the agriculture labor force from 
1939 to 2007.  Perhaps this is due to the direct consequence of conservation programs, 
commodity buyouts, decoupling of payments, or the substitution effect of lower cost capital as 
well. Perhaps changes in economic conditions for both the non-farm and farm sectors have 
occurred at such a continuous, rapid, and unpredictable pace that policymakers have been unable 
to modernize policy quickly enough to increase the standard of living in the farm economy. 
Regardless, it is encouraging from a policy perspective that the positive relationship 
between labor migration and government payments has diminished in recent years. This could be 
a sign of more effective government policy and a sign of increased initiatives designed to 
promote a more sustainable agricultural labor force. Consider the inclusion of initiatives aimed at 
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young and beginning farmers in the 2008 Farm Bill, such as the Beginning Farmer and Rancher 
Development Program, Down-Payment Loan Program, and the Beginning and Socially 
Disadvantaged Farm and Rancher Land Contract Payment (Iowa State University 2009).  
These programs are in response to a concerning trend in agriculture, the aging of the farm 
population which threatens to further weaken the industry over the long-term. According to Gale 
(1994), entry into farming by the ‘next generation’ holds a place of central importance in the 
determination of industry structure and the total number of farmers and farm families. Currently, 
these young and beginning farmers are receiving a minority share of direct government 
payments. Mishra et al (2002) shows government assistance is most often received by large, 
wealthier farms that are less likely to work off-farm. More effective government policy could be 
a viable option to slow the drift of younger, more educated workers from the farm labor force 
and preserve the next generation of farmers’ migration from agriculture.       
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CHAPTER 3: DOES FAMILY MATTER? EXAMINING LABOR SUBSTITUTION ON 
U.S. FARMS 
 
Introduction    
An often discussed issue in farm policy is the effect of government payments on the allocation of 
labor between farm and off-farm work. Some forms of payments provide clear theoretical 
implications for the hours devoted to farm labor, namely coupled payments (Dewbre and Mishra 
2007). An increase in coupled payments is expected to unambiguously increase the hours 
devoted to farm labor. Conversely, an increase in decoupled payments can either have no effect 
or decrease the number of hours worked on the farm. In which case, the impact of decouple 
payments is an empirical questions. From a policy perspective, a common criticism of decoupled 
payments is this exact situation where decoupled payments are thought to decrease the hours 
worked on farm and essentially subsidize greater off-farm labor.   
 A key piece of information required to address this proposed criticism is the substitutability 
of farm labor. The more homogenous is family and hired labor, the easier farm operators and 
spouses can use decoupled government payments to hire replacement workers on the farm. The 
operator and spouse can then engage in the profit maximizing behavior of working higher 
earning jobs off-farm or simply enjoy greater hours of leisure. Aside from profit maximization, 
farm operators and their family members may be attracted to less variable off-farm wages 
(Mishra and Goodwin 1997).  These results of homogenous farm labor make sense intuitively, 
but intuitively can we expect these forms of labor to be equivalent. 
 For example, consider a situation in which a farm operator’s child is now of legal age to 
work full-time on the farm.  This individual has been raised on the land, has likely established a 
relationship with their co-workers, and is familiar with the farm operations.  Contrast this with a 
hired worker who does not have in–depth knowledge of the particular farmland, does not have 
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longstanding relationships with their co-workers, and must learn the daily workings of the farm 
operation. A steeper learning curve can be expected for the hired worker relative to family labor, 
ceteris paribus. Conversely, family labor might lack consistency because family members might 
perceive greater job security and less motivation to work at maximum productivity.  It can be 
argued that hired labor would then have a greater contribution to production than family laborers, 
and again, farm labor would not be homogeneous. Regardless of which form of labor is more 
productive, it is logical to expect productivity differences in the types of farm labor.  
 The objective of this paper is to test the homogeneity of farm labor hypothesis while 
making no a priori assumptions as to the substitution relationship between hired and family 
labor.  A flexible cost function approach is used, thereby allowing the data to reveal the true 
relationship between hired and family labor. Specifically, we use farm-level data from the 
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) to estimate a translog cost function jointly 
with factor share equations via seemingly-unrelated regression (SUR).  Controlling for both farm 
size and production regions, the results provide little evidence to support the homogeneity 
assumption and further indicate that the elasticity of substitution is unitary under most scenarios. 
However, a notable exception was found when controlling for farm size. Our results show that 
the largest hog and cash grain farms have the highest elasticity of substitution (120.95 and 
36.60).       
Theoretical Considerations and Literature Review 
In the foundational work on farm household models by Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), it is 
stated that family and hired labor are assumed perfect substitutes and can be added directly.  This 
assumption implies that each additional unit of family and hired labor has an identical impact on 
production, costs, and profits.  This notion continues in more recent research (Blanc, Cahuzac, 
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and Elyakime 2008); however, family and hired labor may result in differing impacts on the 
production processes of the farm (Deolalikar and Vijverberg 1982, 1978; Huffman 1976). 
Consider the farm household model as proposed by Blanc et al. (2008) and derived from Dawson 
(1984), where the decision to allocate labor to off-farm work and hire farm labor is separated 
into four regimes—assuming hired and family labor are perfectly substitutable.  The farm 
household is expected to follow a utility maximization framework where U denotes utility. The 
utility is a function of leisure (   (     )) and income (( (     )).   Both farm household 
income and the time devoted to leisure are a function of the time devoted to farm labor (  ) and 
off-farm labor (  ).   
      (   (     )  (     ))     (1) 
 
     
 
               (2) 
                 (3) 
                    (4) 
Utility maximization in equation 1 is subject to the total available hours (T) allocable to leisure, 
farm labor, and off-farm labor (equation 2), the full income constraint (equation 3), and non-
negativity constraints (equation 4). The full income constraint is defined as the sum of income 
from off-farm labor (    ), farm profits (  ), and other household non-labor income (V) minus 
the total income (I). Farm profits are further defined as the value of farm production minus the 
input costs. Specifically, 
      ( (     )   )               (5) 
where    is the price of farm outputs, f(. ) is the farm production function,    is a vector of 
prices for inputs to production   , and    is the wage paid to hired labor   . Now, let the farm 
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production function  ( (     )   ) be a Cobb-Douglas production function of the following 
form: 
 ( (     )   )    
  ∏   
   
      (6) 
where    is a vector of farm inputs and  (     ) describes the farm labor input as a function of 
hired and family labor. The Lagrangian ( ) can be constructed for the outlined maximization 
problem with the following first order conditions: 
 (   (     )  (     ))   (           )   (7) 
  (           ) 
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                (
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) (    )  (9) 
where      is equal to the value marginal product of farm labor and          
 Let us now consider two alternative definitions for  (     ).  The common approach to 
the farm household model, which assumes perfect substitution between labor inputs, is 
represented by L
O
:   
  (     )        (    )     (10) 
Alternatively, the relationship can be characterized by a quadratic function where the elasticity of 
substitution between hired and family labor is non-constant. 
  (     )                    
      
           (11) 
From the first order conditions described by equations 8 and 9, we can derive four labor regimes 
from our utility maximization framework (Blanc, Cahuzac, and Elyakime 2008). The value of    
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in the following regimes is dictated by our choice of functional form for  (     ) and the 
resulting marginal physical product of family labor (
  (     )
   
) .  
                        
              
→                     (12) 
                        
              
→                     (13) 
                        
              
→                     (14) 
                        
              
→                     (15) 
If we assume perfect substitution between labor inputs then   (     ) is the labor input 
included in the farm production function (equation 6), which results in a very simplistic 
representation of our labor regimes where    . Under the case of perfect substitutability, 
           which implies a single wage for farm labor and thereby a shared demand 
curve for hired and family labor.  
 Graphically, Figure 3 illustrates the effects of increases in decoupled government 
payments on the labor-leisure mix of farmers currently devoting some time to off-farm work 
under the assumption that farm labor is characterized by   (     ). An increase in (V) in our 
theoretical model is equivalent to a increase in decoupled government payments. This will have 
the effect of increasing household income at all points along the household income curve 
(YA→YB).  Again, greater levels of income are preferred to less, therefore the household obtain a 
higher level of utility (U1→U2) from the increased decoupled payments. The increased income 
from decoupled government payments will either cause the hours of farm labor to remain 
constant or increase. Time devoted to off-farm labor decreases from TEa to TEb or from length (b 
+ c) to (b), while leisure increases from (d) to (c + d). Again, there will either be no effect or 
decrease hours worked by the operator and spouse on the farm.  
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 Alternatively, if farm labor is represented by equation (11) then   (          ) 
and there is not a single wage or single demand curve for farm labor. If    (          )  
 , then as hired and family labor become more highly substitutable (   ) the number of hired 
workers will increase. The more highly substitutable is farm labor, the more freely the farm 
operator and change labor allocations to maximize income and leisure. The inverse is also true 
that as   increases, the hours of labor from hired workers will fall. This implies that an increase 
in decoupled payments will be less likely to subsidize increased hired labor the lower the rate of 
substitution between types of farm labor.  
  
  
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3:  Effect of Decoupled Payments on Time Allocation of Farm Family When Working  
 Some Off-Farm  (Dewbre and Mishra, 2007)  
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Prior research has attempted to measure the elasticity of substitution between hired and 
family labor. The studies have largely been limited to estimation of production functions for 
farm output, generally using a Cobb-Douglas functional form (Deolalikar and Vijverberg 1982; 
1978). These two studies analyze the substitutability of farm labor in India and Asia. Deolalikar 
and Vijverberg (1982) estimated a Cobb-Douglas production function for farm outputs as a 
function of farm labor and other farm inputs.  The farm labor input is then represented by a 
second production function nested within the farm production function. Using data from 268 
districts in India (1970-1971) the authors estimated the aggregate output of 22 major crops.  The 
best-fit production model, as determined by a standard F-test, included a nested CES production 
function for farm labor which was restricted to a Cobb-Douglas specification. Deolalikar and 
Vijverberg (1987) extended the 1982 study to include farms in both India and Malaysia.  A 
Cobb-Douglas production function was once again used for farm outputs, while a generalized 
quadratic production function was used to represent hired and family labor.  A sample of 476 
Indian and 100 Malaysian farm households, for 1974-1975 and 1976-1977, were used in the 
estimation of aggregate output.  In both of these studies, perfect substitutability of hired and 
family labor was rejected.  
Huffman (1976) demonstrated a similar result using a cross section of aggregate county 
data from the 1964 Census of Agriculture.  Specifically, Huffman used data for 276 counties in 
Iowa, North Carolina, and Oklahoma and estimated the ratio of hired labor (  ) and farm 
husband or wife (   ).  The elasticity of substitution,      between hired labor and farm wives 
was 1.152. However, the elasticity of substitution was much lower between hired labor and farm 
husbands (0.682); therefore, the rate at which farm husbands can be replaced by hired labor is 
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relatively lower than that of farm wives.  In an absolute sense, both farm husbands and wives do 
not exhibit perfect substitutability with hired labor. 
There are several weaknesses to the above mentioned studies. First, the studies are small 
in scope and regionally focused. Secondly, some models have imposed a priori relationships 
regarding the elasticity of substitution for farm labor. The current research has the advantage of 
an improved methodological approach and a more recent farm-level data. We use a large, 
nationwide dataset comprising farms of different economic sizes and locations in the United 
States.   
Empirical Model 
The flexible translog functional form is well established in the literature (Binswanger 1974; 
Berndt and Wood 1975; Diewert and Wales 1987; Bigsby 1994; Greene 2008).  It allows for 
estimation with an unrestricted substitution relationship between factors of production. 
  (  )         (  )  
 
 
     (  )
   ∑     (  )  
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     ∑      (  
 
   )  (  )     
    
 
 
    
   ∑      (  
 
   )   
The variable    represents the respective quantities of hogs, all cash grains, and cash grains 
excluding corn outputs.  Hog farms were chosen because these operations are vertically 
integrated and generally more labor intensive than other farm types.  Cash grain farms are 
relatively less reliant on labor due to the increasing use of specialized machinery and receive 
significant farm program payments (USDA 2010).  Additionally, there is empirical evidence that 
the operators and spouses of cash grain farms have a higher likelihood of participating in off–
farm work (Ahearn et al 2006).   
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The input prices for hired labor, family labor, capital, land, and feed expense (specific to 
hog production) or fertilizer/chemical/pesticide expense (specific to cash grains) are represented 
by the variables (     ) in equation (16).  Also included in the model are the constant (  ) and 
time trend (T). The parameters                              and     are estimated, with 
particular attention given to the interaction term (   ) for hired labor and family labor. The cost 
function is estimated jointly with (n-1) factors of production.  By dropping one share equation 
(equation 17), the system becomes non-singular and can be estimated by SUR (Greene 2008).   
   
   (  )
   (  )
 
    
  
    ∑      (  
 
   )       (  )              (17) 
A homogeneity restriction (equation 18) is included to ensure a proportional increase in all factor 
costs results in a proportional increase in production. This assumption also maintains that a 
change in all factor prices will not change the relative quantities of each factor used in 
production (Bigsby 1994).   
 ∑   
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From the cost share equations (17) and the interaction effect (   ) from the estimated cost 
function, the Allen partial elasticity of substitution can be calculated using the following 
equation. 
    
   
    
         (19) 
 
If        is positive and significant, then as        approaches infinity the assumption of perfect 
substitution between hired and family labor is increasingly justified.  If        is insignificant, 
then          and the substitution relationship between family and hired labor is unitary. We 
also include a variable for time in the model which helps determine the appropriate functional 
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form for modeling farm labor. If the elasticity of substitution is unitary, then the significance of 
the time trend variables will help us determine whether the Cobb-Douglass function is an 
appropriate representation of this relationship. 
Data 
The data used in this research is pooled from the 2006-2008 Agricultural Resource Management 
Survey (ARMS).  ARMS is conducted annually by ERS and the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS). The survey collects data to measure the financial condition and operating 
characteristics of farm businesses, the cost of producing agricultural commodities, and the well-
being of farm operator households.   
 The target population of the survey is operators associated with farm businesses 
representing agricultural production in the 48 contiguous states. A farm is defined as an 
establishment that sold or normally would have sold at least $1,000 of agricultural products 
during the year. Farms can be organized as proprietorships, partnerships, family corporations, 
nonfamily corporations, or cooperatives. Data is collected from a single, senior farm operator, 
who makes most of the day-to-day management decisions.  
The survey design of ARMS allows each sampled farm to represent a number of farms 
that are similar, referred to as a survey expansion factor.  The Jackknife variance estimation 
method is commonly used to calculate the standard errors when using the full dataset under this 
survey design (Dubman 2000). This research utilizes a subset of the data; therefore, the Jackknife 
method is not used. However, hypothesis tests for parameter significance were performed using 
both z tests and t tests because of the relatively small samples for some trials. There was no 
significant difference in results between the two tests, but the likelihood of rejection in a small 
sample is still theoretically higher for the t test. Recall, the null hypothesis of farm labor 
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homogeneity rests primarily on the magnitude and significance of the interaction parameter 
(      ).  Considering the goals of this study, the z test serves as a more conservative procedure; 
therefore, it is used exclusively in the reported results.    
 Data on production cost, input prices, and output quantities were taken from ARMS for 
both hog producers and an aggregate of cash grain crops.  Both livestock and crop production are 
analyzed in this study to determine whether farm type has a significant effect on labor 
substitutability.  The cash grains included in this study are corn, soybean, wheat, sorghum, and 
barley.  Models are estimated both including and excluding corn from this group to determine 
whether there is a structural difference between corn and the remaining cash grains. 
Table 5:  Share of U.S. Farms Belonging to Each Organization Typology (Hoppe et al, 2007) 
 Share 
Small Family Farms    90.28% 
Low Sales 18.78 
Medium Sales 6.32 
Residential/Lifestyle 39.73 
Retirement 16.07 
Limited Resource 9.38 
Large Family Farms    7.49% 
Large 4.08 
Very Large 3.40 
Non-Family Farms    2.23% 
 
The sample data is restricted to family farms only, which account for approximately 98 
percent of all U.S. farms (see Table 5).  Additionally, 85 percent of total production and nearly 
90 percent of all cash grain production can be attributed to family farms (Hoppe et al. 2007). 
Large and very large family farms also specialize in cash grains more than any other agricultural 
commodity and tend to employ the majority of hired farm workers. The share of work hours 
accounted for by hired labor on large and very large family farms amounts to 21.8% and 55.5%, 
respectively. Therefore, controls for farm size are included in the model to capture the scale 
effects. Farms with sales less than $250,000 are considered small, those with sales between 
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$250,000 and $499,999 are considered large, and farms with sales of $500,000 or more are 
considered very large. 
 
Figure 4:  ERS Resource Regions 
 
Farming regions are defined by Economic Research Service (ERS). ERS Resource 
Regions (Figure 4) are used to determine financial, economic, and resource-related issues 
affecting farmers and are characterized by similar farm attributes, commodities produced, 
physiographic, soil, and climate conditions (Isserman, 2002). Controls for region are included to 
determine whether the heterogeneous product mix and/or labor market conditions in alternative 
regions influence the substitutability of farm labor. Notably, approximately half of all hired farm 
labor is located in the West and Southwest U.S. The Northeast is the most populated region in 
the U.S. yet employs the fewest number of hired farm laborers for crops or livestock. According 
to ERS (2000), the Fruitful Rim accounts for the largest share of large and very large family 
farms, while the Northern Great Plains has the largest of all U.S. farm operations. 
 The cost of hired labor (   ) is defined as WAGERATE in the ARMS dataset.  This is the 
National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) average wage rate for hired labor, including 
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Social Security taxes for the year. The cost of family labor (   ) is calculated as (OPPD + 
SPPD)/ (OPHRS + SPHRS), where OPPD is the amount paid to the principal operator for farm 
work, SPPD is the amount paid to the spouse for farm work, OPHRS and SPHRS is the total 
annual hours worked on the farm by the operator and spouse. Other family members, such as 
children and siblings, devoting labor to the farm are omitted from the family farm wage 
calculation due to data limitations.   
The price of land (     ) is calculated as the value of land and buildings per acre.  Cost 
of capital (  ) is calculated as the ratio of total interest expense to total farm debt. In the case of 
hogs, the feed price per hog (     ) is in included in the model.  In the case of cash grains, the 
fertilizer, lime, and chemical expense per acre (     ) is included in the model.  The farm 
expenses related to interest payments, fertilizer/chemical/pesticides, and feed were reported 
directly by farmers in the ARMS survey. Total costs (C) are assumed to be variable; therefore, 
total cash operating expense is used as the dependent variable in the cost function.  The cost 
function is estimated for three groups (K) of farm products:  hogs, all cash grains, and cash 
grains excluding corn.  The output (  ) of each product groups is included in the cost function 
for the respective models.    
Cost share equations are estimated for four of the five variable inputs to permit estimation 
of the system of equations.  The cost shares for capital, hired labor, family labor, 
fertilizer/chemical/pesticide expense, and feed expense were included in the model. The reported 
value for each of these expenses was divided by total operating expenses to obtain cost shares. 
Specifically, the cost share for hired farm labor (   ) was calculated as the sum of hired labor 
expense, contract labor expense, and labor fringe benefit expenses divided by total operating 
expenses.  This definition fully accounts for the farm expenses attributable to hiring farm labor.  
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The cost share for family labor (   ) was calculated as the total amount paid to operators and 
spouses divided by the total operating costs. The cost share equation for land was omitted from 
the system for multiple reasons.  First, it was a common input across all of our product classes. 
Second, neither labor cost share equation could be omitted due to the focus of our study.  These 
two considerations reduced our choices to either capital or land, and our confidence in accurately 
specifying the cost share for capital was greater than for land. 
Our dataset is pooled from 2006 to 2008; therefore, a time trend is included in the model.  
Linear, squared, and interaction terms between time and each input price are included. The 
primary goal of the time variables is not to make strong conclusions regarding the changes in 
technology over this short period, but rather the interaction effects between time and the labor 
input variables will determine whether Hicks-neutrality can be assumed. This information is 
important when consider the proper specification of  (     ).  
Results and Discussion       
Our results for cash grains farms, both including and excluding corn, provide little evidence to 
support the notion that hired and family labor are perfect substitutes. Table 6 shows that in all but 
one case the elasticity of substitution is unitary. The analysis of cash grains with no regional 
controls resulted in an elasticity of substitution of 20.64, which still provides considerably weak 
support for the notion of perfect substitution. In light of this result, we then consider the trials for 
the Heartland, Northern Great Plains, Prairie Gateway, Fruitful Rim, and Basin and Range 
regions. The entire east coast, namely the Northern Crescent, is omitted from this group. For the 
all regions trials, including corn, the addition of the Northern Crescent region and other 
East/Southeastern regions did not change the results.  When the 203 corn farms in the Eastern 
region were removed from the sample, the results changed significantly for the all regions group 
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of cash grains, excluding corn. This result may indicate a structural difference in labor 
heterogeneity between corn farms and the remaining cash grains for the Eastern U.S.     
Table 6:  Elasticity of Substitution, Cost Shares, and Estimated Interaction Effect for Hired and 
Family Farm Labor on Cash Grain Farms by Regions 
  Including Corn Excluding Corn 
ERS Resource Regions N      ̂    ̂       N      ̂    ̂       
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, and Fruitful Rim 1081 0 11% 3% 1 983 0 11% 3% 1 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, and Basin and 
Range 1049 0 10% 3% 1 958 0 10% 3% 1 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, Fruitful Rim, 
and Basin and Range 1133 0 11% 3% 1 1034 0 11% 3% 1 
Prairie Gateway, Fruitful Rim, 
and Basin and Range 355 0 12% 2% 1 329 0 12% 3% 1 
All Regions 1577 0 12% 3% 1 1374 0.07 12% 3% 20.64 
 
 The results for hog farms (Table 7) were consistent across regions as well. These trials 
exhibited little variation in sample size and composition.  The concentration of hog farms to a 
core regional set of the Heartland, Northern Great Plains, Northern Crescent, Prairie Gateway, 
and Eastern Uplands is not surprising considering the documented consolidation and 
concentration of the hog industry.
5
 In every regional setting, the elasticity of substitution is 
unitary. 
Table 7:  Elasticity of Substitution, Cost Share, and Estimated Interaction Effect for Hired and 
Family Farm Labor on Hog Farms by Regions 
ERS Resource Regions N      ̂    ̂       
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, Northern Crescent, Prairie Gateway, Eastern 
Uplands, Southern Seaboard, and Mississippi Portal 185 0 10 2 1 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, Northern Crescent, Prairie Gateway, Eastern 
Uplands, and Southern Seaboard 185 0 10 2 1 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, Northern Crescent, Prairie Gateway, Eastern 
Uplands, and Mississippi Portal 181 0 10 2 1 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, Northern Crescent, Prairie Gateway, and 
Eastern Uplands 181 0 10 2 1 
All Regions 190 0 10 2 1 
 
                                                          
5
 According to data from the USDA (2010), the top five hog producing states in 2007 (Iowa, North Carolina, 
Minnesota, Illinois, and Indiana) were responsible for 67 percent of all hogs produced domestically. 
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Especially applicable to hog operations, the standardization of tasks and scale economies 
of larger farms are expected to have important implications on labor substitutability. Testing for 
heterogeneity of farm labor across farm sizes resulted in three test groups for each output (Table 
8).  Results indicate that the scale of operation indeed had an impact on the substitutability of 
farm labor. Interestingly, labor on cash grain farms including corn exhibited a complimentary 
relationship for the smallest farms. Perhaps this reflects the relationship between farm profits and 
the family wage. For example, as the quantity of hired labor declines, a farm’s operating costs 
decline. Holding revenue constant, this results in greater farm profits. As farm profits increase, 
we would also expect higher farm household wages.  
Table 8:  Elasticity of Substitution for Hired and Family Farm Labor Controlling for Farm Size 
Farm Size 
Cash Grains Including 
Corn 
Cash Grains Excluding 
Corn Hogs 
Small -39.30 1 1 
Large 36.58 1 1 
Very Large 36.60 1 120.95 
 
For cash grains including corn, the elasticity of substitution was approximately 37 for 
both large and very large farms. However, when excluding corn, the elasticity of substitution was 
unitary for both large and very large farms.  Large and very large cash grain farms were found to 
be substitutable at an approximately equal rate, but this was not the case with hog farms. These 
farms exhibited a dramatic increase in labor substitutability from large to very large farms. 
Specifically, the elasticity of substitution was unitary for small and large hog farms but increased 
to 120.95 for very large farms. As expected, hog operations with the greatest mechanization and 
standardization display the greatest labor substitutability. Similarly, Blanc et al. (2008) found 
family farms in Europe were more likely to use permanent hired labor as farm size increased 
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thereby allowing family labor to specialize in managerial tasks while hired labor specializes in 
other non-managerial and operational labor.  
Using regional controls provides a different view of the relationship between farm labor. 
It was consistently shown that farm labor is not perfectly substitutable and has an elasticity of 
substitution of one. In particular, notice the difference in the elasticity of substitution for hog 
farms when controlling for regions and farm size. The results for the regional trials would lead 
you to believe all hog farms have the same labor characteristics as a small or large hog farms, 
whereas, the bulk of hog production results from the very large operations. The effects of farm 
size appear to be more significant than regional location for hog farms in this situation. This also 
appears to be the case with the cash grains that include corn. 
Also included in our model were time trend variables to help determine the appropriate 
functional form for farm labor (Table 9). For hog farms, the interaction effect between hired 
labor/time and family labor/time was found insignificant in all trials; therefore, the cost-
minimizing ratio of these inputs can be assumed to be constant over the period of study.  From 
this perspective, our evidence leads to the conclusion that labor on small and large hog farms is 
best represented in the farm household model by a Cobb-Douglas production function across all 
regions. However, labor on very large hog farms may be best represented by a quadratic 
production function. Relative to our other trials, very large hog farms provide the most 
compelling evidence for the linear production function as well.     
The results in Table 9 support Hicks-Neutrality for cash grain farms, both with and 
without corn production, located Prairie Gateway, Fruitful Rim, and Basin and Range. The 
remaining trials demonstrated consistently that, over time, increases in the cost of hired labor are 
positively correlated with farm production costs.  Family labor costs were found to have a 
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negative relationship to farm production costs over time.  This is consistent with the fact that, in 
most cases, family labor receives net profits at the end of the crop season as payment for hours 
worked on the farm. Farm operators and spouses are often paid by withdrawing these farm 
profits in the form of an owner’s draw. Assuming farm revenue holds constant, declining farm 
production costs will increase profits, resulting in a rising family labor wages.  
Table 9:  Interaction Effect of Hired and Family Labor Prices with Time for Cash Grain Farms 
Cash Grains 
Including Corn  Hired Labor Family Labor 
ERS Resource Regions     
Std 
Error Z P>|z|     
Std 
Error Z P>|z| 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, and Fruitful Rim 0.102 0.039 2.64 0.008 -0.060 0.018 -3.36 0.001 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, and Basin and 
Range 0.087 0.039 2.24 0.025 -0.051 0.018 -2.82 0.005 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, Fruitful Rim, 
and Basin and Range 0.106 0.037 2.86 0.004 -0.053 0.017 -3.07 0.002 
Prairie Gateway, Fruitful Rim, 
and Basin and Range 0.046 0.057 0.81 0.419 -0.037 0.031 -1.20 0.232 
All Regions 0.083 0.03 2.73 0.006 -0.047 0.014 -3.26 0.001 
 
Cash Grains 
Excluding Corn  Hired Labor Family Labor 
ERS Resource Regions     
Std 
Error Z P>|z|     
Std 
Error Z P>|z| 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, and Fruitful Rim 0.073 0.038 1.92 0.055 -0.065 0.018 -3.62 0.000 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, and Basin and 
Range 0.068 0.039 1.76 0.079 -0.052 0.018 -2.88 0.004 
Heartland, Northern Great Plains, 
Prairie Gateway, Fruitful Rim, 
and Basin and Range 0.084 0.036 2.35 0.019 -0.061 0.017 -3.54 0.000 
Prairie Gateway, Fruitful Rim, 
and Basin and Range 0.035 0.057 0.62 0.537 -0.044 0.031 -1.39 0.166 
All Regions 0.054 0.031 1.78 0.076 -0.043 0.015 -2.91 0.004 
 
This evidence leads to the conclusion that labor on cash grain farms, including corn, 
might be best represented in the farm household model by a translog or quadratic production 
function. For cash grains excluding corn, we repeatedly found evidence that the substitution 
relationship is unitary.  This group may lead the researcher to utilize a more stringent functional 
form, like the Cobb-Douglass production function, and ignore the effects of time.  Alternatively, 
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the researcher may choose a more flexible, yet computationally burdensome, approach like the 
translog production function that allows for a unitary elasticity of substitution and controls for 
time. Further, when controlling for farm size, our results found no evidence for rejecting Hicks-
neutrality with respect to farm labor in either of our cash grain groups.  Due to the variability in 
elasticity of substitution, a translog or quadratic functional form might be the most appropriate 
representation of the farm labor in the farm household model when controlling for farm size.  
Conclusions     
This study addresses the issue of labor substitutability from two perspectives. First, if the farm 
household can benefit from either the operator or spouse devoting time to off-farm work then 
how easily can they be replaced on the farm?  Second, if the forgoing assumption in the literature 
is correct, then hired and family labor are perfectly substitutable and can be replaced without 
additional costs. Our results provide further insights into these questions and reflect the inherent 
difficulties in replacing family labor on the farm.  
Addressing the assumption of perfect substitution, this study compliments the literature 
by both addressing some of the weaknesses of prior research and re-affirming the results through 
alternative methods.  The particular weaknesses addressed were data quality and the imposition 
of a priori relationships between farm labor imposed by functional forms.  This research allowed 
the data to reveal the underlying true nature of labor substitutability with minimal assumptions. 
The results largely indicate that the assumption of perfect substitutability between hired and 
family labor is weak in most cases. Prior studies provided evidence of this relationship being 
unitary but did address the impacts of farm size, region, and farm type. Our results largely 
support the prior literature when addressing the question from a regional perspective. However, 
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we provide new insights and gain greater knowledge of situations where assuming perfect 
substitutability is more suitable by controlling for farm size.  
From the perspective of labor allocation, it appears less plausible that farm operators and 
spouses can seamlessly allocate labor off-farm while hired hands fulfill their duties on-farm. This 
appears true for all but the operators and spouses of very large farms.  An interesting question 
then is how off-farm labor has become the primary source of income for farm families. It is 
possible that the availability of inexpensive, immigrant labor has allowed the farmer to work off-
farm with little impact on production in previous periods. Perhaps the wages paid to immigrant 
labor have either increased to that of native workers in recent periods or have simply gone 
unreported.  In either case, the data from 2006 to 2008 does not reflect a situation where farm 
families can freely allocate labor off-farm.  
The issue of labor substitutability also extends beyond off-farm labor allocation. With the 
aging of the farm population, it will become ever more important for operators to decrease their 
responsibilities on the farm without negatively impacting the operation. Future changes may 
stem from new technologies like real-time kinematic autosteer. These technologies decrease the 
specialized knowledge needed to operate farm machinery and allow the farm operator to track 
the exact movements of machinery in the field. As the cost to adoption declines, this may allow 
farm operators to increasingly hire labor to fulfill their responsibilities without detriment to 
production.       
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CHAPTER 4: WORKING OFF-FARM: JOINT DECISIONS OF THE OPERATOR AND 
SPOUSE 
 
Introduction 
There are four well documented trends occurring nationally and in U.S. agriculture. First, the 
increasing presence of diabetes, obesity, and heart disease have contributed to declining levels of 
national health and increased the need for healthcare. Second, the cost of health insurance has 
risen dramatically over recent decades. Third, off-farm labor has increasingly become the 
primary source of income for farm households. Finally, there has been a significant “aging” of 
the farm population. At the convergence of these trends lies the issue of how the off-farm labor 
decisions of farm operators and spouses are affected by the increasing needs and costs of health 
insurance.   
 The high cost of health insurance and the burden placed on businesses in all sectors of the 
economy to provide these benefits to their employees has been well publicized by the media. The 
high risk and financial stress inherent in the farm business makes it increasingly important to 
address the impact on the farm household. The farm family is faced with the choice of assuming 
the greater financial risk necessary to fund their health insurance benefits or have at least one 
member of the family work off-farm to obtain these benefits from an outside employer. In 
essence, working off-farm for fringe benefits decreases the financial stress placed on the farm. If 
you consider that fringe benefits and hourly labor wages account for the total wage earned off-
farm, the results of Mishra and Goodwin (1997) support the notion of a positive relationship 
between income stability and off-farm labor.    
 A 2004 survey conducted by the Economic Research Service asked farm operators and 
spouses the most important factor in their decisions to work off-farm. The most important reason 
was increasing household income. Obtaining health insurance was also listed as an important 
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reason for particularly the spouse allocating labor off-farm (USDA 2005). Further consider that 
approximately 98% of all domestic farms are family owned and off-farm income accounts for 
approximately 80% of total household earnings (USDA 2010 and Mishra et al. 2002; El-Osta, 
Mishra, and Morehart 2008). It is clear that off-farm income is not transitional but rather the 
primary source of income (Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre 1992).     
 Another subtly related issue is the debate surrounding the next Farm Bill. There have been 
rumors of removing decoupled payments due to budgetary pressures. In most studies of the 
impact of decoupled payments on farm household labor allocation, the role of fringe benefits is 
ignored. As insurance costs continue to rise and changes in the nature of farm payments become 
increasingly likely, fringe benefits will continue to grow in importance as a component of the 
total wage and be even more vital to consider when evaluating the effects of agricultural policy. 
As will be further discussed, omitting fringe benefits from the full wage will result in the farm 
household’s welfare lost being underestimated when decoupled payments are reduced.   
Rather than address the decision to participate in off-farm labor, we choose to focus on 
the hours of labor supplied off-farm. Specifically, we model labor allocation as a joint decision 
in the farm household and determine the impact of health insurance coverage from off-farm 
sources. We further contribute to the literature by utilizing copulas to empirically test for joint 
decision-making between the operator and spouse prior to estimating the labor supply model. 
This improves our analysis in multiple ways. First, the results of the copula test are used to guide 
model selection. Prior literature verifies the accuracy of the jointness assumption post-
estimation. Second, we find that insurance coverage for the operator and spouse is endogenous. 
Knowledge of the jointness in our data allows us to confidently estimate the predicted values of 
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these values using a bivariate probit model. These predicted values can then be incorporated into 
the joint estimated labor supply equations.  
Following from the results of the copula test and auxiliary bivariate probit regression, we 
estimate the off-farm labor supply of the operator and spouse using a bivariate tobit model. The 
data used in this research is from 2006-2008 Agricultural Resource Management Survey 
(ARMS). Most notably, the results of this study demonstrate that the off-farm labor supply of the 
operator and spouse are positively correlated and that there is a highly significant, positive 
impact of off-farm insurance coverage on the hours worked off-farm. These results further 
demonstrate the importance of fringe benefits as a component of the total wage. We also find 
significant evidence that greater government payments decrease the number of hours that both 
the operator and spouse work off-farm.  
Literature Review 
During the past three decades, self-employed farm households have engaged in dual employment 
where married farm couples (operators and spouses) allocate their labor to farm work and off-
farm work. Dual employment has provided a critical income source to a majority of self-
employed farm households not only in the US and Western European countries but also in 
developing countries (e.g., Benjamin, Corsi, and Guyomard, 1996; Mishra et al. 2002; Ahearn, 
El-Osta & Dewbre, 2006; Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006; El-Osta, Mishra and Morehart, 2008; 
Glauben et al. 2008). Economists have investigated issues, including public policy, education, 
and wealth, that impact labor allocation decisions in dual employment for self-employed farm 
couples.  
 Most dual employment studies use a theoretical model that posits jointness by married farm 
couples in the decision to participate in off-farm work. In each of these studies researchers begin 
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by implementing a theoretical household model where the labor allocation decision is jointly 
determined. Researchers then use post-estimation methods following probit/tobit models to test 
for jointness in the decision model. Dependence is measured by a correlation parameter (rho) 
between the error terms of two simultaneous off-farm labor supply functions, either Tobit or 
probit, of farm operators and spouses. Hypothesis testing of whether rho is significantly different 
from zero then follows the estimation.  
 The empirical evidence of dependence in these studies is inconclusive. 
1
 For example, 
although Lass, Findeis, and Hallberg (1989), Lass and Gempesaw (1992), Mishra and Goodwin 
(1997), El-Osta, Mishra and Ahearn (2004), and El-Osta, Mishra and Morehart (2008) use a 
theoretical model that jointly determines labor allocation decision, none of the empirical testing 
and evaluation of the models demonstrates evidence of joint labor decision-making in U.S farm 
households. Further, this method assesses the appropriateness of the empirical model for the 
theory post hoc. In these studies, testing the dependence between operator and spouse labor 
decisions has been approached more from the perspective of testing “goodness of fit” rather than 
as a useful tool for guiding model selection. 
Copulas provide a consistent procedure for testing dependence and guiding the choice of 
empirical model. Copulas are functions that parameterize the dependence between univariate 
marginal distribution functions to form a joint distribution function (Quinn, 2007). Copulas can 
be used to measure the dependence between the off-farm labor supply by married farm couples 
by assembling a joint distribution for household labor allocation decisions from the respective 
marginal distributions of the hours worked off-farm by the operator and spouse. Another benefit 
is flexibility in the distributional assumptions of both marginal distributions and copula function. 
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This method allows us to move past the issue of whether to model jointness as a guided 
choice and instead formulated a tested modeling decision. The work of Ahearn, El-Osta, and 
Dewbre (2006) provides an excellent point of reference for the current research and helps 
motivate further the value of this test. The authors dedicate considerable time and discussion to 
the motivation of their decision to model off-farm labor participation of the operator and spouse 
jointly. The current research aims to build upon their findings with regards to the off-farm labor 
participation decision of the operator and spouse. This research found that the formulation of 
government payments was less relevant to the off-farm labor participation decision of the 
operator and spouse than the amount of payments. They found that government payments have a 
negative impact on the off-farm labor participation of the farm operator and spouse. Similarly, 
the results of Chang and Mishra (2008) further demonstrate the negative relationship between 
government payments and off-farm labor participation. In addition to focusing on the labor 
supply rather than participation decision, we also build upon this research investigating the role 
of fringe benefits.  
Fringe benefits can be viewed as a component of off-farm wage.  According to Findeis 
(2002), as off-farm wages increase labor is pulled “off” the farm and into the off-farm labor 
market, whereby the expected result is more off-farm work and less self-employment to the 
extent that the marginal returns to off-farm work exceed the marginal returns to self-
employment. Jensen and Salant (1985) demonstrated fringe benefits have a positive correlation 
with the hours farmers are employed off the farm.  These studies demonstrate the parallel 
between off-farm wages and fringe benefits, as well as the common effect they have on hours 
worked off-farm.   
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Including fringe benefits in full off-farm wage can have significant implications on the 
welfare analysis of the farm household following policy changes. A brief example from an 
aggregate level can be found in Figure 5. The market demand curves for leisure and farm labor is 
illustrated in the left-hand graph, while the market supply curve for off-farm labor is represented 
on the right-hand side.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Effect of Decoupled Government Payments, including Fringe Benefits, on the Market  
 Model for Farm Labor, Leisure and Off-Farm Labor 
 
From the market supply and demand curves, the welfare effects of changes in decoupled 
government payments and fringe benefits can be visualized. In Figure 5, an decrease in 
decoupled government payments shifts the demand curve for leisure downward.  As a result, the 
reservation wage falls from W* to W
A
, a less time is supplied to farm labor (T* to T
A
), and fewer 
hours of leisure is demanded.  This decreased demand for leisure and related decrease in 
reservation wage implies that farmer will devote the same amount of time to off-farm labor even 
at a lower off-farm wages such that the new reservation wage is exceeded.  This causes the off-
farm labor supply curve, excluding fringe benefits, to increase in length from (L→L’) to 
(L’’→L’). The off-farm labor supply curve, including fringe benefits, increases in length from 
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(L→L*) to (L**→L*). The dark gray triangle represents the increased welfare lost association 
with a decline in government payments when fringe benefits are considered. Note that this 
representation does not indicate whether the hours of off-farm labor will change or in which 
direction, it only demonstrates a change in the reservation wage and therefore the length of the 
supply function on which the operator and spouse will work.  
The most important implication for this brief welfare discussion is the importance of 
these considerations in policy analysis. With the current debate about the Farm Bill and coming 
changes in healthcare coverage, understanding how these pieces fit together and ultimately 
impact the farm household is crucial. The following section outlines a more rigorous 
examination of the farm household while addressing the consequences of joint decision-making 
and inclusion of fringe benefits in the theoretical model.  
Theoretical Model 
The following theoretical model of the farm household model illustrates the dependence between 
the off-farm labor allocation decision of the operator and spouse (Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre 
2006; Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986). The farm household follows a utility maximization 
framework where it’s assumed that the farm operator (O) and spouse (S) comprise the farm 
household and utility (U) is a function of leisure (   (     )) and income ( (     )). Both farm 
household income and the time devoted to leisure are a function of the time devoted to farm 
labor (  ) and off-farm labor (  ).   
      (   
 (  
    
 )    
 (  
    
 )  (     ))   (1) 
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 )       (2) 
   
    
    
 (  
 )       (3) 
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Utility maximization in equation (1) is subject to the total available hours (T) allocable to leisure 
(   ), farm labor (  ), and off-farm labor (  ) of the operator (equation 2) and spouse (equation 
3), the full income constraint (equation 4), and non-negativity constraints (equations 5). Notice 
that   
  is a function of the off-farm hours worked by the spouse (  
 ). This allows for jointness 
in off-farm labor allocation decisions. The full income constraint is defined as the sum of income 
from the operator’s off-farm labor (    
   
 (  
 )), spouse’s off-farm labor (    
   
 (  
 )), farm 
profits (  ), and other household non-labor income (V) minus the total income (I). Farm profits 
are further defined as the value of farm production minus the input costs. Specifically, 
      (  
    
    )        (6) 
The Lagrangian ( ) can be constructed for the outlined maximization problem with the 
following first order conditions for off-farm labor: 
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 Per the cross-partial derivative in equations (8) and (9) if the off-farm labor allocation 
decision of the spouse is independent of the operator, then  
   
 
   
  
   
 
   
  = 0. For the operator, this 
implies that utility is maximized where the marginal rate of substitution (        
 ) between 
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leisure and income is exactly equal to the off-farm wage. This is the representation of off-farm 
labor allocation often assumed. According to Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre (2006), there is 
conflicting empirical evidence supporting the validity of this dependence.  A method of testing 
this dependence prior will be proposed in the following section. 
 Further consider the concept of the full wage. This implies that the off-farm wage is a 
function of both the hourly wage ( ) and fringe benefits (  ); therefore,     
  and     
  can be 
further defined  ̅   
 (    
    ) and  ̅   
 (    
    )   By rearranging the first order conditions in 
equations (8) and (9) and including our newly defined terms for off-farm wage, we can see more 
clearly the impact of health insurance on the off-farm labor allocation decisions of farm families. 
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The total wage is non-decreasing in     
      
   and    holding all else constant. For example, 
an increase in health insurance benefits received off-farm will increase   . In equation 11, an 
increase in    will result in an increase in  ̅   
 (    
    ) and if labor decisions are made jointly 
(
   
 
   
 )  ̅   
 (    
    ) will increase or decrease depending on the direction of dependence. Our 
expectations for changes in off-farm labor supply will also depend on the relative magnitudes of 
the marginal effects. For example, if (
   
 
   
 )    then a change in fringe benefits can have the 
following effects: 
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According to (12), an increase in health insurance will increase the total off-farm wage earned by 
the spouse by a greater amount than the dependence weighted increase of the operator. This will 
result in a greater marginal rate of substitution of leisure for income for the spouse and therefore 
greater hours worked off-farm. Conversely, equation (13) describes a situation where an increase 
in health insurance impacts the operator’s off-farm wage by a greater amount than the spouse. 
This results in the spouse substituting fewer hours of leisure for income and working fewer hours 
off the farm. Equation (14) demonstrates equally offsetting results from increased health 
insurance and no effect on the off-farm labor supply of the spouse. 
 More simply, if (
   
 
   
 )    then an increase in health insurance will increase fringe 
benefits and thereby increase the total off-farm wage earned by the spouse. This results in an 
increase in the right hand side of the equality in equation (11) which then implies greater 
substitution of leisure for income and greater hours worked off-farm. It’s important to note that 
the discussed changes in fringe benefits under joint labor decisions will alter the off-farm labor 
supply of both the operator and spouse. The discussion was limited only to the changes in off-
farm hours of the spouse for brevity and clarity.  
Data 
This research utilizes Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data from 2006 to 
2008. The ARMS is conducted annually by the Economic Research Service and the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (for more detail, see http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/ARMS/ ). 
The survey collects data to measure the financial condition (farm income, expenses, assets, and 
debts) and operating characteristics of farm businesses, the cost of producing agricultural 
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commodities, and the well-being of farm operator households. The target population of the 
survey is operators associated with farm businesses representing agricultural production in the 48 
contiguous states. Data is collected from a single, senior farm operator, who makes most of the 
day-to-day management decisions.  Also collected was wage data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistic (2011). By state and year, we calculate the weighted average wage earned from off-farm 
work. The weight used is the portion of the state population employed in each sector.   
The list of variables, with summary statistics, used in our labor supply model can be 
found in Table 10. We limited our study to farm households where either the farm operator or 
spouse is under the age of 65. This excludes all households that are fully covered by Medicare. 
We also exclude all households that did not respond to hours worked off-farm or reported hours 
per week worked on or off-farm greater than 140. This applies to farms that reported 140 worked 
at either location separately or additively. In other words, any operator or spouse responding that 
they on average sleep fewer than four hours per night is assumed to have incorrectly completed 
the survey and are dropped.   
The dependent variables in our bivariate tobit equations are the hours per week worked 
off-farm by the operator and spouse, respectively. For each equation, we include explanatory 
variables for age, age squared, education, household size, distance from the off-farm job, off-
farm wage, and whether they obtain health insurance from an off-farm source. The specific 
survey question asks respondents under the age of 65 whether they have insurance coverage from 
an off-farm job. 21% of the operators in our sample report that they are covered by an off-farm 
job. As expected, more spouses (30%) reported that they received insurance coverage from an 
off-farm source.  
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Table 10: Summary Statistics 
Variables Description Mean Std Dev 
Operator Off-farm Hours Off-Farm hours per week 13.99 (20.14) 
Spouse Off-farm Hours Off-Farm hours per week 22.58 (19.59) 
Operator Age Age in years 51.74 (9.61) 
Spouse Age Age in years 49.34 (9.15) 
Operator Education Total years of education 13.62 (1.85) 
Spouse Education Total years of education 13.94 (1.91) 
Operator Miles from Job Miles from off-farm job 5.79 (29.64) 
Spouse Miles from Job Miles from off-farm job 9.96 (97.84) 
Operator Insurance 1 if the operator has health insurance through 
off-farm work; 0 Otherwise 
0.21 (0.41) 
Spouse Insurance 1 if the spouse has health insurance through 
off-farm work; 0 Otherwise 
0.30 (0.46) 
Off Farm Wage Hourly wage 21.11 (1.80) 
Government Payments Annual payments in $1,000 20.67 (50.80) 
Sales Total value of farm sales in $1,000 370.42 (2423.67) 
Household Size Number of members of household 3.17 (1.43) 
Metro/Non-Metro 1 if the farm is located in 2000 Population 
Census metro area; 0 Otherwise  
0.38 (0.49) 
Dairy 1 if the farm specializes in dairy farming; 0 
Otherwise 
0.12 (0.32) 
Heartland 1 if farm located in the Heartland region;  0 
Otherwise 
0.17 (0.38) 
Northern Crescent 1 if farm located in the Northern Crescent 
region; 0 Otherwise 
0.16 (0.37) 
Northern Great Plains 1 if farm located in the Northern Great Plains 
region; 0 Otherwise 
0.06 (0.24) 
Prairie Gateway 1 if farm located in the Prairie Gateway region; 
0 Otherwise 
0.11 (0.31) 
Eastern Upland 1 if farm located in the Easter Upland region; 0 
Otherwise 
0.10 (0.30) 
Southern Seaboard 1 if farm located in the Southern Seaboard 
region; 0 Otherwise 
0.14 (0.34) 
Fruitful Rim 1 if farm located in the Fruitful Rim region; 0 
Otherwise 
0.16 (0.37) 
Basin and Range 
1 if farm located in the Basin and Range 
region; 0 Otherwise 0.05 (0.22) 
Mississippi Portal 1 if farm located in the Mississippi Portal 
region; 0 Otherwise 
0.05 (0.22) 
y2006 1 if data from year 2006; 0 Otherwise 0.35 (0.48) 
y2007 1 if data from  year 2007; 0 Otherwise 0.34 (0.47) 
y2008 1 if data from year 2008; 0 Otherwise 0.32 (0.47) 
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As will be determined in the following section, we suspect that off-farm insurance 
coverage is jointly determined with the hours worked off-farm. Individuals working greater 
hours off-farm are more like to receive health insurance benefits and off-farm benefits are not 
likely to be received until a certain number of hours are accrued each week. If the operator 
insurance and spouse insurance variables are found endogenous, then we will estimate the 
predicted probability of insurance coverage and include these estimates as explanatory variables 
in our labor supply equation. 
In addition to operator and spouse specific variables, we use farm, location, and time 
specific variables as explanatory variables. Farm specific, we include variables for total 
government payments, total farm sales, and an indicator variable for dairy farms. Dairy farms 
were specified due to the labor intensive nature of these farms. Location specific variables 
include an indicator for metro/non-metro location and ERS Resource Region (Figure 6). For the 
ERS Resource regions, the Mississippi Portal is used as the reference region in our study. 
Because we utilize a pooled sample, indicator variables for year are included. The reference year 
in this research is 2006.   
The ARMS has a complex stratified, multiframe design where observation in the ARMS 
represents a number of similar farms when using the provided expansion factors. The expansion 
factors are most useful and recommended when the goal of the research is making 
generalizations about the population of farms or the full survey is used. The recommended 
procedure in this scenario is the delete-a-group jackknife procedure (Dubman 2000; National 
Research Council of the National Academies 2007).  There is not clear or unanimous support for 
using the jackknife approach when using subsets of the data or complex, multivariate analyses. 
Goodwin and Mishra (2006) argue that it is not clear whether stratification alters the likelihood 
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function beyond the simple weights and whether it is appropriate to apply the predefined 
jackknife replicate weights to subsamples of the ARMS data.  Similar to El-Osta (2011), we 
employ a bootstrapping technique rather than the jackknife procedure for remedying the sample 
design problems in this subsample.  
 
Figure 6:  ERS Resource Regions 
 
Empirical Methods 
 Copulas
6
 can be used to test whether  
   
 
   
   and  
   
 
   
  are significantly different from zero 
and determine whether there is positive or negative dependence. Copulas allow us to assemble a 
joint distribution for household labor allocation decisions from the marginal distributions of the 
hours worked off-farm by the operator and spouse. In this context, the test of  
   
 
   
  = 
   
 
   
  0 can 
be viewed as whether the joint distribution is significantly different than the product of the 
marginal distributions for the farm operator and spouse off-farm work hours. 
                                                          
6
 This application of copulas is reproduced from a manuscript in press in Applied Economic Letters. See Appendix 
for authorization from the publisher, Taylor & Francis Group.   
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 An m-dimensional copula (C) connects an m-dimensional cumulative distribution function 
(F) to the one-dimensional marginals (F1,….,Fm) such that  
 (       )   (  (  )      (  ))  (15) 
where y represents the variables of interest. Specifically, a two dimensional copula using off-
farm labor allocation of the operator (  ) and spouse (  ) is presented as  
 (     )   (  (  )   (  )   )  (16) 
and includes a dependence parameter ( ). This parameter measures the dependence between the 
marginal distributions. If  =0, then the marginal distributions are statistically independent. Some 
copula functions reduce directly to the product copula in the case where the joint probability 
distribution is the product of the marginal distributions. If   is significantly different than zero, 
then we can use the information to guide our model selection decisions for estimating functions 
of off-farm labor supply by farm households. Both copula functions and the respective marginal 
distributions are fit to the data via maximum likelihood estimation. The log likelihood function 
takes the following form: 
 ( )   ∑     (  (   )   (   )   )
 
     ∑ ∑      (   )
 
   
 
     (17) 
 An important advantage of copulas in this regard is flexibility in distributional 
assumptions. The marginal distributions can be chosen independently of each other. 
Additionally, the copula function can be chosen independently of the marginal distributions. We 
chose to specify the marginal distributions for operator and spouse off-farm labor as normally 
distributed.  Aside from the large number of observations at zero hours worked off-farm, the 
histograms for both the operator and spouse appeared normal. Other trials were performed with 
more flexible distributions, but none offered significant benefits above the normal distribution. 
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 We provide results for two functional forms of the copula. First, the Frank copula is a 
symmetric copula function permitting both positive and negative dependence. 
  (         )    
         (       )(       ) (     )⁄     (18) 
The marginal distributions are represented by    and    in equation (18). This function permits 
  (    ) where the Frechet lower and upper bounds are defined at these limits. The 
dependence parameter is reported in our results as the Kendall’s tau (  ), which is defined as 
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and   ( ) is the Debye function 
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where    (    ) thereby implying perfect negative and perfect positive correlation as the 
dependence parameter approaches the Frechet lower and upper bounds.   
 The Clayton copula is also used in this research. Unlike the Frank copula, the Clayton is 
not symmetric. Only positive dependence is permitted by the Clayton copula; therefore, the 
dependence parameter   (   ). At zero, the marginal distributions are statistically 
independent. The Frechet upper bound is obtained at the upper limit. The Clayton copula is 
defined: 
  (         )   (  
     
    )       (21) 
and our results for the dependence parameter ( ) are reported using the the Kendall’s tau (  ) 
where 
    
 
   
   (22) 
where    (   ) thereby implying zero correlation and perfect positive correlation.   
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 Tables 11 and 12 present the estimates of dependence in dual employment using Frank 
and Clayton methods, respectively.  First, we consider the results of the symmetric Frank 
Copula. We find evidence of a positive and highly significant relationship between off-farm 
labor supply of farm operators and spouses. The correlation measure for this trial is consistent 
and ranges from 0.23 in 2006 to 0.19 in 2008. Also, the pooled test of dependence is about 0.22. 
These estimates add to the confidence and power in using copulas to test for dependence. 
Finally, the dependence parameter estimates (column 3) are very consistent across the three 
surveys and pooled data as well. Findings from the Frank copula procedure guided our decision 
to use the Clayton copula to constrain the dependence parameter to (   )   
Table 11:  Testing for Dependence between Hours Worked Off-farm by Operator and Spouse:  
   Frank Copula Method 
Frank Copula Kendall’s  Dependence Parameter Standard Error 
Pooled 0.2250 1.3844*** (0.0490) 
2008 0.1896 1.1576*** (0.0858) 
2007 0.2543 1.5760*** (0.0863) 
2006 0.2280 1.4035*** (0.0827) 
 
 
Table 12:  Testing for Dependence between Hours Worked Off-farm by Operator and Spouse:  
   Clayton Copula Method 
Clayton Copula Kendall’s  Dependence Parameter Standard Error 
Pooled 0.2744 0.7563*** (0.0230) 
2008 0.2317 0.6030*** (0.0385) 
2007 0.3135 0.9135*** (0.0426) 
2006 0.2737 0.7536*** (0.0383) 
 
 Results from the Clayton copula functional form are presented in Table 12 Again, as in 
Table 11, we find evidence of a positive and highly significant relationship between the off-farm 
labor supply of farm operators and spouses. Interestingly, the correlation increases in magnitude.  
For example, the correlation measure ranges from 0.27 in 2006 to 0.23 in 2008. Finally, the 
dependence parameter estimates (column 3) are very consistent across the four surveys and 
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pooled data as well. Interestingly, the parameter estimates are close to those obtained in the 
Frank procedure (Table 11). Findings here suggest that an increase in operators’ off-farm labor 
supply increases spouses’ off-farm labor supply. This may result from a variety of reasons but 
measure of dependence does not provide any intuition as to why. What is does provide is 
guidance in our modeling decision for addressing these questions. Now we choose to model the 
determinants of off-farm labor supply of the farm operator and spouse using a bivariate tobit 
model rather than independent tobit models.   
 A seemingly unrelated regression model can be adapted such that a tobit model can be 
used rather than simple regression (Brown and Taylor 2008). Specifically,  
  
                (23) 
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  (24) 
  
                (25) 
   {
  
                 
   
                  
  (26) 
Equations (23) and (24) represent off-farm labor supply equations for the operator and spouse. 
  
  and   
  are the untruncated latent variables allowing for theoretically negative values 
representing the hours worked off-farm by the operator and spouse, respectively.    and    are 
the left censored dependent variable for off-farm hours worked by the operator and spouse. 
Vectors of i and k explanatory variables (   and   ) and parameters (   and   ) are included in 
the model. We denote separately the explanatory variable and parameters for insurance coverage 
for the operator and spouse. The parameter value and explanatory variable for the operator is 
represented by    and   . Similarly, the parameter value and explanatory variable for the spouse 
is denoted    and   . The error terms are denoted    and   .  These disturbances are joint 
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normally distributed with variances   
  and    
  where        (      
    
   ) and the 
covariance is given by            . From the estimated parameter ρ we can verify post-
estimation the results of our copula test. If this parameter is non-zero, then joint estimation 
results in greater efficiency and implies dependency between the dependent variables. The 
results from this model are not directly interpretable as the marginal effect of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable; therefore, we further calculate the marginal effects. 
According to Greene (2008) the marginal effects in a bivariate tobit context can be calculated in 
the same manner as a univariate model:  
  ( )
  
  (    )   (27) 
where (    ) is the cumulative normal distribution function.  
 Our explanatory variables    and    are dummy variables representing whether the 
operator or spouse obtains health insurance coverage from off-farm sources. We suspect that this 
variable is determined jointly with the number of off-farm hours worked. The Smith-Blundell 
test is used to test for endogeneity because the structural model is a tobit (Baum 1999). Under 
this test, the null hypothesis states that all variables are exogenous. Under the alternative 
hypothesis, the insurance coverage variable is expressed as a linear projection of a set of 
instruments. The residuals from this first stage regression are added to the model. If the null is 
not rejected, then these residuals have no explanatory power. For both the operator and spouse 
equations the null hypothesis is rejected –with a p-value=8.0e-128 and p-value=3.1e-64, 
respectively.  
 To address endogeneity of the health insurance variable in our model, we use the predicted 
probability of insurance coverage for the operator and spouse. Recall the results of our copula 
test that off-farm labor allocation decisions are made jointly; therefore, we will model the 
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predicted probability of insurance coverage jointly using the bivariate probit model. According 
to Greene (2008) and Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre (2006):  
  
  {
  
                  
                               
   (28) 
  
  {
  
                  
                             
    (29) 
 [  |     ]   [  |     ]     (30) 
   [  |     ]     [  |     ]     (31) 
 [     |     ]     (32) 
where     and    are binary variables indicating health insurance coverage from off-farm work 
for the operator and spouse,    and    are vectors of exogenous variables,    and    are vectors 
of estimated parameters,    and    are error terms, and   is the coefficient of correlation between 
the error terms.  
 When specifying the equations in the bivariate probit model, there must be at least one 
variable that is highly correlated with the dependent variable in equations (28) and (29) but 
uncorrelated with the dependent variables in (23) and (25). The exogenous instruments used in 
these equations are a variable indicating personal expenditure on insurance, health, and 
retirement benefits and a variable indicating expenditure on fringe benefits for hired workers. 
The payment of fringe benefits to hired workers is expected to be negatively correlated with 
insurance coverage from off-farm work of the operator or spouse. If a farmer is going to pay for 
benefits to cover their workers, then they are more likely to cover themselves as well. Personal 
expenditure on insurance, health, and retirement benefits is indeterminate in sign. It can be 
argued that those expending personal funds on these benefits are less likely to be covered from 
other sources and therefore pay these expenses out of necessity. Conversely, it can be argued that 
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those paying for these expenses are more concerned about being fully insured and financially 
secure; therefore, they seek out off-farm employment providing these benefits as well.  
Table 13:  Results from Bivariate Probit Estimation for Predicted Value Insurance Coverage 
Variable 
Operator Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
Spouse Coefficient 
(Std Error) 
Age   0.0735*** 
(0.0120) 
 0.0708*** 
(0.0119) 
Age Squared -0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
Education  0.0714*** 
(0.0077) 
 0.1411*** 
(0.0072) 
Household Size -0.0414*** 
(0.0114) 
-0.0747*** 
(0.0110) 
Personal Insurance Policy  0.1736*** 
(0.0293) 
 0.2188*** 
(0.0267) 
Fringe Benefit to Hired Labor -1.0846*** 
(0.0320) 
-0.3356*** 
(0.0260) 
Constant -2.8621*** 
(0.3175) 
-3.6140*** 
(0.2972) 
N  11,262 
    2,118.71*** 
 
 In addition to these exogenous instruments, we regress operator and spouse insurance 
coverage on age, age squared, education, and household size. The results from this regression are 
found in Table 13. Notice the explanatory variables are all significant at 1%. We further test for 
instrument strength using a joint F-test for the operator and spouse equations. The F-test value 
for each equation was large and significant at 1%; therefore, we can reject the null that all 
parameters are jointly equal to zero and conclude that at least one of our instruments in each 
equation is not weak. 
 From these results, we calculate the predicted probability of the operator having health 
insurance from off-farm sources holding the spouse’s equation constant and vice versa. These 
predicted values will then be used in our structural model outlined by equations (23) through 
(26). These equations can be rewritten with the predicted values notated  ̂  and  ̂  as: 
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This bivariate tobit model will be estimated via maximum likelihood. Due to the use of predicted 
values, standard errors were calculated using bootstrapping techniques. Following Cameron and 
Trivedi (2009), 500 iterations were used in our calculation of standard errors.    
Estimation Results 
Our results for the estimation of off-farm labor supply indicate a positive and highly significant 
relationship between the predicted probability of insurance coverage and the hours worked off-
farm for both the operator and spouse (Tables 14 & 15). Recall the estimated dependence 
parameters from the copula tests were positive (Tables 11 and 12). The estimated dependence 
parameter from the bivariate tobit model servers as a post-estimation check figure. Our results 
indicated   is equal to 0.3704. This estimate is slightly higher than our copula results, but still 
within a reasonable proximity. Jointly considering the results of our dependence estimates and 
insurance coverage variables, our empirical results support the theory that greater fringe benefits 
will increase hours worked off the farm when  (
   
 
   
 )   . Surprisingly, the hourly wage earned 
off-farm was not significant in either equation. This finding does not invalidate numerous studies 
that have established this relationship, yet it does lend support to the relative importance of the 
fringe benefits component of the full off-farm wage. 
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Table 14:  Results from Bivariate Tobit Estimation for Hours Worked Off-farm by Operator  
Variables Coefficient Marginal Effects Standard Error 
Operator Age -0.1799 -0.4936 (0.3229) 
Operator Age Squared -0.0015 -0.0021 (0.0032) 
Operator Education -0.2420 -0.8891 (0.2178) 
Operator Miles from Job  0.2026***  0.0193 (0.0108) 
Operator Insurance  108.1474***  83.6783 (3.2627) 
Off Farm Wage  0.2178  1.2511 (0.2915) 
Government Payments -0.1531*** -0.0283 (0.0121) 
Sales -0.0010** -0.0001 (0.0004) 
Household Size  1.0018***  1.0427 (0.3210) 
Metro/Non-Metro  0.9708  0.3636 (0.8467) 
Dairy -27.6412*** -4.3565 (1.7389) 
Heartland -0.7148 -0.1451 (2.1102) 
Northern Crescent  3.7994*  0.7281 (2.2959) 
Northern Great Plains -1.5110 -0.1662 (2.4173) 
Prairie Gateway  3.6410*  0.5457 (2.1794) 
Eastern Upland  3.4081  0.5042 (2.1667) 
Southern Seaboard -3.6316* -0.6294 (2.1607) 
Fruitful Rim  2.0463  0.3769 (2.2711) 
Basin and Range  0.0888  0.0090 (2.5539) 
y2007 -2.9753***  (0.9746) 
y2008 -3.9621***  (1.0480) 
Constant -16.6355*  (10.0375) 
Sigma Operator  34.6483***  (0.4162) 
Rho  0.3704***  (0.0214) 
N  11,262 
    2,842.78*** 
 
 The demographic information on the operator and spouse had differential impacts. The 
operator, age, age squared, and education were all insignificant. Alternatively, the age of the 
spouse was found to increase the hours worked off-farm at a decreasing rate. Surprisingly, more 
educated spouses were found to work fewer hours off-farm. Aside from the unexpected sign, this 
is interesting considering spouses in the sample were found to be more highly educated than the 
operator on average (Table 10).  Household size also had differential impacts on the hours 
worked off-farm by the operator and spouse. Larger households were positively correlated with 
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greater hours worked off-farm by the operator. Considering the documented relationship between 
income stability and off-farm labor supply (Mishra and Goodwin 1997), this makes senses 
considering operators will need a larger, more stable income to support larger families. Larger 
households were found negatively correlated with the hours worked off-farm by the spouse. This 
is likely due to the spouse being increasingly responsible for dedicating labor to household labor 
rather than monetary wages as the household size grows.  
Table 15:  Results from Bivariate Tobit Estimation for Hours Worked Off-farm by Spouse 
Variables Coefficient Marginal Effects Standard Error 
Spouse Age  0.8500***  2.264631 (0.2570) 
Spouse Age Squared -0.0110*** -0.0109 (0.0028) 
Spouse Education -0.6915*** -2.63409 (0.2469) 
Spouse Miles from Job  0.0213***  0.001253 (0.0024) 
Spouse Insurance  87.1231***  113.4051 (4.3200) 
Off Farm Wage -0.1183 -0.6808 (0.1967) 
Government Payments -0.0272*** -0.00501 (0.0058) 
Sales -0.0012*** -0.00013 (0.0002) 
Household Size -0.4879** -0.51148 (0.2428) 
Metro/Non-Metro -1.7034*** -0.64733 (0.5770) 
Dairy -6.6748*** -1.0922 (0.9767) 
Heartland  1.1450  0.227157 (1.3928) 
Northern Crescent -0.7660 -0.14923 (1.5238) 
Northern Great Plains -1.4808 -0.16374 (1.5944) 
Prairie Gateway -1.6964 -0.25571 (1.4488) 
Eastern Upland -1.9914 -0.28937 (1.4597) 
Southern Seaboard -0.8757 -0.15022 (1.4207) 
Fruitful Rim -3.4057** -0.63741 (1.5104) 
Basin and Range -2.5794 -0.26432 (1.7094) 
y2007 -1.4037**  (0.6595) 
y2008 -0.6052  (0.7129) 
Constant -7.1355  (7.4901) 
Sigma Spouse  26.4551***  (0.2440) 
Rho  0.3704***  (0.0214) 
N  11,262 
    2,842.78*** 
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   In addition to operator and spouse characteristics, farm characteristics and location also 
have important effects on off-farm labor supply. We find for both the operator and spouse that 
dairy farmers work fewer hours off-farm. This result is expected due to the labor intensity of the 
dairy farms. A greater distance from the off-farm job was also found positively correlated with 
the number of hours worked off-farm by both operator and spouse. If you consider the mileage 
traveled to work a fixed cost to the employee, then greater travel distances required higher 
earnings to justify the trip. Therefore, the worker must work greater hours off-farm to increase 
earnings, all else constant. Location of the farm is also an important factor in determining off-
farm labor supply. Farms classified as metro were found to have spouses allocating fewer hours 
to off-farm work. While location in a general sense has an impact on off-farm labor supply, 
limited evidence was found of a strong regional impact on off-farm labor supply. Dummy 
variables were included for year. Relative to 2006, both operators and spouse worked fewer 
hours off-farm in 2007 and operators only worked fewer hours off-farm in 2008.  
Conclusion 
This research contributes to the literature threefold. First, it provides a formal test and empirical 
evidence of jointness in the off-farm labor allocation decisions of operators and spouses. Second, 
it controls for endogeneity between off-farm hours and insurance coverage from an off-farm 
source. In calculating the predicted values, we further allow for jointness in the operator and 
spouse decision-making. Third, we demonstrate the strong positively relationship between the 
probability of insurance coverage and the number of hours worked off-farm by the operator and 
spouse. This result in conjunction with our theoretical model and evidence of jointness provide 
confident conclusions from these estimates.  
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 The magnitude, direction, and significance of the insurance coverage and government 
payment variables tie back to our proposed link between changes in health care policy and the 
Farm Bill legislation. In this setting, significant decreases in decoupled payment can be expected 
to lead to greater hours worked off the farm by both operators and spouses. We can see clearly 
that insurance coverage is a substantial factor in their full off-farm wage; therefore, from a 
welfare perspective this must be accounted for when discussing the impacts of policy changes on 
the farm household. Otherwise, you possibly underestimate the degree to which welfare is lost by 
the farm household.   
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation provides new knowledge on the labor allocation of the farm family. The second 
and fourth chapter provides insights on the incentives to leave the agricultural sector. 
Specifically, the second chapter provides evidence of increased government payments increasing 
migration of agriculture from 1940 to 2007. A closer examination shows that this effect was 
dominate from 1940 until 1996 and weakened in the years following 1996. In fact, the link 
between increased government payments and labor migration disappeared completely in recent 
years. The fourth essay demonstrates the powerful impact of health insurance coverage. We find 
that both the operator and spouse work greater hours off-farm as the probability of health 
insurance coverage increases. We also find that as government payments increase, the hours 
worked off-farm decline significantly for both the operator and spouse.  
 The third chapter provides new knowledge on how replaceable operator and spouse labor 
are on the farm. If their labor can be freely replaced by hired workers, then the operator and 
spouse can more easily capitalize on opportunities off-farm. This is important when considering 
the role of both fringe benefits and government payments. First, the more highly substitutable is 
family labor the greater the net benefits accrued to the farm household by engaging in dual 
employment for insurance coverage. The farm can operate at the same level of efficiency from a 
unit of family or hired labor and the farm business escapes the financial burden imposed by 
providing full benefits. As substitutability declines, the tradeoff between the lost returns to the 
farm business from loss of family labor must be compared to the gains accrued from working 
off-farm. In which case, the expectations for labor allocation become less clear.  
 A similar result holds for government payments. Under homogenous farm labor, the 
prospect of farm households using decoupled government payments to subsidize greater hours of 
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leisure or off-farm work become increasingly probable. As substitutability declines, the cost to 
decreasing farm labor become greater and subsidized off-farm labor or leisure become less 
probable for the farm family.   
Consider what these results may imply for the period of study prior to 1996. In Figure 7, 
the axes are represented by income (Y) and Time (T), where T=24 hours and is allocated to farm 
labor, off-farm labor, and leisure. An increase direct government payments will result in an 
upward shift in the household earnings curves (Ya→Yb) and greater income results in a higher 
level of utility for the farm household (U1→U2).  In this case, greater government payments lead 
to fewer hours worked on the farm and greater hours worked off-farm.  
As discussed in the second chapter, this effect can be reasoned through multiple avenues. 
It can be assumed that all payments will behave in a similar manner to decoupled payments and 
that the relevant concern is only the magnitude of payments. Alternatively, the positive 
relationship between government payments and labor migration can be reasoned through the 
impact of Conservation Reserve or Commodity Buyout Program payments. In both cases, we 
will get an upward shift in the household earnings curves. In either case, this results in the hours 
devoted to farm labor decreasing from (a + b) to (a), and the hours devoted to off-farm labor to 
increase from (c + d) to (b+c) where (b>d). The hours devoted to leisure then increase from (d) 
to (d + e). A further consideration is the relative dominance of the income and substitution 
effects. As the income effect increases, the hours of leisure will increase relative to hours of total 
work.  
Now consider the breakdown in the relationship between government payments and labor 
migration following 1996. Together with the evidence of heterogeneity of farm labor from the 
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third chapter, Figure 8 demonstrates that farm labor is less likely to adjust to a change in 
government payments.  
  
  
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7:  Effect of Decoupled Payments on the Time Allocation of Farm Family When Working 
  Some Off-Farm (Pre-1996) 
 
As a result of the increased payments, the hours of farm labor remains constant (a) in 
Figure 8. Whether hours worked off-farm increases/decreases rests on the whether the 
substitution effect outweighs the income effect. If the income effect is relatively stronger (U2,a) 
then the hours of off-farm labor will decrease from (b + c) to (b). This will result in a decrease in 
total hours of labor and increased leisure from (d + e) to (c + d + e). If the substitution effect 
(U2,b) is relatively stronger then off-farm labor will increase from (b + c) to (b + c + d). In this 
case, total hours of labor will increase and leisure will decrease from (d + e) to (e).     
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Figure 8:  Effect of Decoupled Payments on Time Allocation of Farm Family When Working  
 Some Off-Farm (post 1996)  
   
Following 1996, this analysis indicates that an increase in government payments will 
influence the total number of hours worked through the impact on off-farm labor supply. In 
Figure 8, off-farm labor supply is dictated by whether the income or substitution effect is 
dominant. As payments become larger, the income effect will increasingly dominate as the farm 
household becomes wealthier. A more subtly factor that affects off-farm labor supply is the 
definition of the off-farm wage.   
Figure 9 incorporates fringe benefits in this discussion of labor allocation of the farm 
household. Including fringe benefits in the off-farm wage will result in an increased slope of the 
linear portion of Ya. This change results in a decrease in farm labor by (b). Off-farm labor 
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increase from (c) to (b + c + d) and leisure declines by (d). This result assumes a dominant 
substitution effect.  
  
  
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 9:  Effect of Fringe Benefits on Time Allocation of Farm Family When Working  
 Some Off-Farm (post 1996)  
 
 Figure 10 demonstrates the effect of increased decoupled payments on labor allocation 
when considering the fringe benefits as a component of off-farm wage. If you compare Figures 8 
and 10, you will notice that for an equal magnitude increase in government payments the change 
in off-farm labor is smaller when fringe benefits are included in the off-farm wage. This reflects 
a more inelastic off-farm labor supply curve. The fringe benefits earned off-farm are not 
available from farm work; therefore, an increase in payments will not induce the farm household 
to reduce off-farm labor beyond the hours required to obtain these benefits. Again, the change in 
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off-farm labor will be dependent on the relative magnitude of the income and substitution 
effects.  
 
  
  
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 10:  Effect of Decoupled Payments on Time Allocation of Farm Family When Working  
 Some Off-Farm (post 1996 including fringe benefits) 
It is important to note that this discussion is centered upon a simplistic representation of 
the farm household model that yields a more concise, illustrative discussion of the results. As 
was demonstrated in chapter four, the labor decisions of the operator and spouse are dependent. 
A graphical representation of the operator’s labor allocation decisions, with respect to the 
spouse’s allocation decisions, stemming from a change in government payments would be 
intractable. While rigorous analysis of these complexities is clearly necessary for accurate 
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theoretical and empirical modeling, these considerations are worthy sacrifices for the clarity and 
understanding of the reader in graphical representations. 
In conclusion, the findings of this dissertation indicate that in recent years government 
policy has decreased the number of hours farm households work off-farm and slowed the rate at 
which they exit the agricultural labor force. This is a change in guard from the years prior to 
1996 where programs like the Conservation Reserve and Commodity Buyout programs may 
have contributed to the migration of labor from agriculture. We also find that the ability of farm 
operator and spouse to replace their labor on the farm is not without cost. Together, these results 
allow us to gain some new insights into how agricultural labor markets functions in dynamic 
policy environments. Finally, this dissertation demonstrates the strong link between fringe 
benefits, like health insurance coverage, and the supply of labor off-farm of the operator and 
spouse. Using copulas, dependence between the off-farm labor decisions of the operator and 
spouse is established. Joint estimation of the operator and spouse labor supply equations then 
indicates the number of hours worked off-farm increases as the probability of insurance coverage 
from off-farm sources increases. Further, it is shown that increases in governments payments 
result in fewer hours of work off-farm.   
82 
 
APPENDIX: PERMISSIONS 
 
 
  
83 
 
From:  Alec.Dubber@tandf.co.uk 
To:  jdanto3@tigers.lsu.edu 
CC:  Josie.Oakley@tandf.co.uk 
  hemavathy.tanasegaran@integra.co.in 
Date:  Mon, Oct 31, 2011 at 5:26 AM 
Subject:  RE: Applied Economics Letters / Article ID: 619483 / Author Query! 
 
Dear Jeremy D'Antoni, 
 
Thank you very much for your query. The following right that you retain as an Applied 
Economics Letters author will apply: 
 
the right to include an article in a thesis or dissertation that is not to be published commercially, 
provided that acknowledgement to prior publication in the relevant Taylor & Francis journal is 
made explicit; 
 
(For the avoidance of doubt, the version which you may use is your original author version and 
not the publisher-created PDF, HTML or XML version posted as the definitive, final version of 
scientific record.) 
 
For more information, please visit http://journalauthors.tandf.co.uk/preparation/copyright.asp. 
 
Please do not hesitate to contact me with any further questions. 
 
 
Kind regards, 
 
Alec Dubber 
 
Managing Editor | Economics, Finance & Development Journals 
Routledge Journals | Taylor & Francis Group  
84 
 
VITA 
 
Jeremy is from Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He graduated from high school at Central High School 
in 2002. Afterward, he enrolled at Louisiana State University to pursue a Bachelor of Science in 
finance. He graduate summa cum laude in 2006 and began working in private industry. In 
January 2008, Jeremy enrolled in the doctorate program in agricultural economics.  
During his graduate program, Jeremy has authored or coauthored four peer reviewed 
journal articles, submitted four additional articles, and presented original research at various 
conferences. His research has focused on the areas of agricultural finance, agribusiness, labor 
economics, and agricultural policy. Jeremy was also President and Co-Founder of the 
Agricultural Economics Graduate Student Association. He served as Fundraising Chairman for 
the Louisiana State University Graduate Student Association and Member-at-Large for Activities 
in the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association Graduate Student Section.  
He also had the honor of being nominated for the Presidential Management Fellowship 
by Louisiana State University. In the summer of 2011, Jeremy was awarded an internship by the 
Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture. In December 2011, 
he will complete his doctorate degree and begin the next stage of his career.  
 
 
 
